Young people are mobilising more than ever before for democracy. Hopes are high that the young can act as a democratic catalyst to turn back the powerful wave of authoritarianism across the world. But is this really possible? This report examines what is driving young people to mobilise, how powerful their engagement is, and what kinds of political participation they are developing. Much is written about youth participation; this report gives the word to young people from around the world to let them speak on these issues. They correct some of the conventional wisdom about youth political participation and reveal the complex dynamics of young people’s role in and for democracy today.

The issue has become vitally important. The year 2025 witnessed a surge in youth-led protests, mainly associated with Generation Z, and many revolts have continued into 2026. The large-scale mobilisation of young people has reignited debates on political representation, participation, resilience, and democratic renewal. Common patterns emerge across countries that have witnessed youth-led mobilisations over the past year, despite the diversity of the contexts. Limited economic opportunities, persistent inequalities, restrictions on civic freedoms and expression, and entrenched political elitism all contribute to mounting frustration among young people.

Despite much comment and analysis, the critical question remains insufficiently explored: are current political systems, institutions, and governance models open and responsive to youth participation?

There might be no single answer as to whether increased youth political participation directly strengthens and sustains democracies. But one principle stands firm: inclusive democracy depends on broad societal engagement, including from the largest age cohort globally – young people.^[i] Yet political representation of the younger generation remains disproportionately low, and not just because of increasing disillusionment with politics among young people. Despite the youth’s demographic strength, political systems are often closed, exclusionary, and at times openly resistant to meaningful youth participation.

Entering political spaces can be extremely challenging for young people, who face a range of structural and cultural barriers. These include the high costs, both monetary and non-monetary, of running for office; age-related eligibility restrictions; closed or unfair electoral processes; gender inequality; and sociopolitical environments that are often unsupportive of or discouraging to youth leadership.^[ii] These intersecting obstacles significantly reduce young people’s motivation and the appeal of formal political engagement.[iii]

This report dissects the different ways in which young civic and political actors are responding to these challenges. It offers an unprecedented range of case studies from all world regions, undertaken by young experts close to these debates. The report challenges the view of young people as a homogeneous group of disillusioned and disengaged citizens. It points instead to a variety of forms of youth-led political participation and explores the implications of these strategies for democratic change. Young people emerge as a democratic catalyst, but not necessarily in the ways often assumed to be the case.

The power of data: the Global Youth Participation Index

This report flows from a new index designed to highlight trends in youth participation. Recognising the essential value of research and data for driving change for youth participation, the European Partnership for Democracy (EPD) launched the first-ever Global Youth Participation Index (GYPI) in 2025. The GYPI tracks and compares data on youth participation from 141 countries across four dimensions: political affairs, the socioeconomic context, elections, and civic space. According to the index, low scores, particularly on the political affairs dimension, are not limited to regions where democracy is new or fragile but are a global phenomenon.^[iv]

The GYPI does not show uniform disengagement, which is often assumed to be the main feature of young people’s attitudes to politics. Rather, the trends are nuanced and varied across contexts. In many places, apparent disengagement from traditional forms of politics has been challenged by other forms of participation whose democratic potential has been ignored or undermined.

Across these alternative forms, many turn to informal spaces, particularly social media and other digital platforms, to express their views, organise, and mobilise. Online engagement has significantly expanded the opportunities for youth participation, but it also poses considerable risks and threats. Digital spaces are not safe from the rapid spread of radical, extremist, and populist narratives, many of which deliberately target young people’s vulnerabilities.

All of this is happening in the context of rapidly shrinking and even closing civic space. Another important finding of the GYPI is that civic space tends to be more open to youth participation than do political affairs or elections. Research also shows that young people have been experiencing a move from apathy to antipathy, as the young seem to be increasingly embracing illiberal preferences and hostility towards democratic institutions whose structures and performance are no longer deemed adequate to respond to young citizens’ needs.[v]

Lessons and insights

To complement the GYPI with qualitative research, the EPD commissioned case studies from members of our Young Researchers’ Network. Their 12 chapters provide a rich breadth and depth of information and examples that shed new light on youth participation.^[vi]

The following studies weave together research and policy findings on youth engagement. They lay out recommendations to promote and sustain a meaningful and transformative approach to youth participation in both formal and informal decision-making. The case studies offer diverse, thought-provoking, and timely reflections on the challenges and opportunities of youth engagement in different contexts. From the studies, five key messages and insights emerge.

First, all contributions point to the need to move beyond the simple question of whether young people engage, and instead to focus on how youth engagement takes place and why it assumes particular forms. This shift in perspective allows for a more nuanced understanding of the drivers, modalities, and motivations that underlie youth participation.

Second, the contributions suggest a mixed picture with regard to the claim that young people prefer informal forms of engagement over mainstream political participation. While some authors do highlight this tendency, others reveal an increasing willingness among young people to challenge thestatus quo by seeking to transform political channels and institutional structures from within.

Third, several of the challenges identified in the contributions operate at the macro level, whereas others are rooted in the micro-context of specific national settings. This duality underscores the importance of engaging simultaneously with broad, structural trends and specific local realities.

Fourth, the case studies demonstrate that the role of a specific regime – or the broader political context under analysis – is more significant in explaining variations in outcomes than are the differences between young people and other segments of the population. In other words, contextual political factors often outweigh generational divides in shaping patterns of engagement.

Last but not least, an in-depth reading of the contributions highlights a paradox. On the one hand, survey data indicates that a growing number of young people are drawn towards illiberal values, parties, and/or regimes. On the other hand, illiberal regimes often impose such restrictions on youth engagement that they push young people towards more radical positions in defence of fundamental liberal rights. These two dynamics coexist and interact, dispelling an overly simplistic narrative that portrays young people as moving inexorably and uniformly closer to authoritarianism.

Case studies

The report presents the following 12 case studies, which explore the diverse layers and angles of youth participation.

Dércio Tsandzana analyses Mozambique’s #PovoNoPoder movement and its online engagement to challenge the narrative of the country’s young people as passive, instead portraying them as closely involved outside the traditional political system. However, Tsandzana also highlights the contradictions and non-linear evolution of this youth engagement, bringing to the fore the valuable contributions of young Mozambicans through digital activism.

Mehmet İlhanlı discusses how the securitisation of young people in Türkiye, which intensified after the 2013 Gezi Park protests, has constrained and reshaped their political engagement. According to İlhanlı, young people are the demographic most affected by the country’s democratic decline, as they are being excluded, stigmatised, and securitised. Despite young people’s efforts to seek alternative spaces for political expression and activism, their continued stigmatisation by the government will have a profound negative impact on Türkiye’s democratisation.

Obaa Akua Konadu-Osei writes about the cost of politics in Ghana, with a particular focus on the intersection between youth and gender as well as the way in which access to financial resources creates a barrier to parliamentary aspirations. The case study highlights the fundamental challenges young Ghanaians face in fully entering democratic channels, even when they are highly engaged and mobilised in the country’s political landscape. Such obstacles, according to Konadu-Osei, are similar for women and youth, implying a need to rethink political-party funding to give young people fairer access to the political system.

Ajda Hedžet investigates the Free El Hiblu 3 campaign to explore how young migrant men claim their voice from the margins of systems that often silence them. The case highlights the limits of institutional recognition, the criminalisation of young migrants, and the digital struggle for justice. It illustrates how political agency and demands for justice are enacted outside formal institutions. The campaign underscores that Europe’s migration governance is both a site of contestation and a front line for democratic renewal.

Olga Paredes Brítez carries out a comparative analysis of municipal youth policies in Buenos Aires (Argentina) and Asunción (Paraguay). Both municipalities have adopted a vision of young people as “adults in the making” – an adult-centric approach that hinders the recognition and empowerment of young people as full political subjects. The case study provides an additional layer of analysis through the perspective of municipal-level youth engagement and discusses the decentralisation and municipalisation processes in the two countries.

Oripha Chimwara explores the impact of Zimbabwe’s quota system of reserved parliamentary seats for young candidates in creating positive ripple effects for youth engagement in the country. Chimwara also analyses the obstacles to young Zimbabweans’ political participation that remain despite this positive step: administrative hurdles, the cost of politics, and a pervasive patronage system.

Mark Ortiz examines intergenerational politics through the 1970 United Nations (UN) World Youth Assembly, highlighting the complexities of youth representation and the lessons for multilateral engagement today. Ortiz compares this gathering with the UN’s 2024 Summit of the Future, where meaningful youth participation was central in reflecting commitments in the UN’s Youth2030 strategy. The two cases illustrate the enduring impact of youth leadership on the ethos and practice of multilateralism.

Ellie Catherall analyses how and to what extent young people’s voices were represented and included in the drafting of Chile’s 2023 proposed constitution. The analysis shows that despite young people’s view that a new constitution should be representative of Chilean society, the dominance of right-wing parties in the drafting process meant the status quo was maintained. Besides this exclusion of youth voices, young Chileans also felt increasingly detached from the process because of a lack of reliable and impartial information.

Wasal Naser Faqiryar describes how young people in Afghanistan are finding alternative channels to express their grievances, ideas, and dreams to counter the oppressive grip of the Taliban regime. Faqiryar identifies art and other creative forms of expression as fundamental avenues that remain possible, as they pass under the radar of the regime’s control. The chapter also discusses social media as an important platform for the amplification and diffusion of the concerns, needs, and desires of young Afghans.

Ambar Kumar Ghosh presents the importance of youth representation in the democratic life of India, a country with a large young population. The analysis looks at the most significant challenges for young Indians in engaging in parliamentary politics: the cost of politics, the role of established parties in nominating young candidates, disillusionment about political careers, the pervasiveness of dynastic politics, and gender disparities. Ghosh argues that granting young people access to legislative politics would have a positive impact on India’s governance structures.

Dechen Rabgyal explains the minimal engagement of Bhutan’s young people in traditional politics through the lens of democratic elitism. Rabgyal shows how despite civil and democratic programmes equipping young Bhutanese to run for office, a requirement for parliamentary candidates to have at least 10 years’ professional experience reproduces inequalities and excludes a significant portion of Bhutan’s young people from the country’s legislature. The case study highlights the importance of adopting a more realistic approach to ensuring youth engagement.

Finally, Intifar Chowdhury writes about the evolving political relevance of mainstream parties in Australia, analysing how younger generations, disillusioned with traditional parties, are moving away from them. Chowdhury highlights a disconnect between the political priorities of younger voters and traditional political parties, which creates a risk of dealignment. In addition, the chapterexamines how young Australians are more closely linked to issue-based politics, on topics such as climate change, education, and housing, than to traditional party-political divisions.

These case studies aim to spark important discussions of the multiple layers and dimensions of youth political participation. Beyond highlighting diverse experiences and approaches, they provide insights that can inform research and advocacy for more meaningful youth involvement. We encourage readers to engage with these studies, which can support efforts to strengthen young people’s agency and influence. In an age when so much hinges on youth participation, this report gives a voice to a unique range of young writers from around the world to shape these debates.

Ana Mosiashvili is a research and programmes manager at the European Partnership for Democracy (EPD).

Sara Canali is a doctoral researcher at Ghent University and UNU-CRIS.

Explore the Full Study

The Young Researchers’ Network is an initiative developed in the framework of the European Democracy Hub and EPD’s Women and Youth in Democracy WYDE Civic Engagement project, supported by the European Union.

Get to know the 12 Young Researchers

^[i] “United Nations Sustainable Development Goals”, United Nations, https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/youth/.

^[ii] “Cost of Politics”, Westminster Foundation for Democracy, https://costofpolitics.net/.

[iii] Gerardo Berthin, “Why Are Youth Dissatisfied with Democracy?”, Freedom House, 14 September 2023, https://freedomhouse.org/article/why-are-youth-dissatisfied-democracy.

^[iv] Brit Anlar et al., “The Global Youth Participation Index: Report 2025”, European Partnership for Democracy, 2025, https://gypi.studiopompelmoes.eu/assets/images/GYPI-Final-Report.pdf.

[v] Roberto Foa and Yascha Mounk, The Danger of Deconsolidation: The Democratic Disconnect (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Kennedy School, 2019).

^[vi] “The Young Researchers’ Network”, Youth Democracy Cohort, https://youthdemocracycohort.com/the-young-researchers-network/.

The post How Young People Are Redefining Political Participation first appeared on Youth Democracy Cohort.

A Comparative Study of Political Generations in Australia

In most advanced democracies, declining electoral turnout is disproportionately concentrated among young people.^[i] For example, in the 2024 United Kingdom general election, less than half of 18- to 24-year-olds cast a ballot, compared with three-quarters of people aged 65 or above.^[ii] Similar trends were seen in recent elections in France and Germany, where young people were considerably less likely to vote than older people.^[iii]

Low electoral engagement underscores democratic inequality: those who are economically and socially disadvantaged abstain from taking part.^[iv] This then introduces a representation bias in public policy, reduces government responsiveness, and compromises political competition.^[v]

With its strictly enforced compulsory voting, Australia has not suffered a similar fall in youth turnout in federal and state elections. Compulsory voting ties young people to the political system, even when they are disillusioned by mainstream party politics. This is almost an enforced exposure to the political system, which prevents apathy and disenfranchisement and stops young people from turning away from democratic politics. Does this mean that youth democratic engagement in Australia manifests itself differently from elsewhere?

The reasons for examining the Australian experience are twofold. First, despite compulsory voting, there has been a gradual and continued decline in Australians’ trust in politics since 2007.^[vi] Satisfaction with democracy has fallen rapidly, in 2019 reaching its lowest level since the 1970s.^[vii] Second, both major political parties have seen a steady decline in their support over the past two decades; they won less than 70% of the primary vote between them in the 2022 and 2025 federal elections.^[viii] This remarkable drop-off is attributed to poor performances by successive governments and a broad detachment from politics across generations. Voters’ poor evaluations of the country’s governance are also reflected in a rise in support for minor parties and independent candidates.

Once among the most satisfied democratic nations in the world, Australia scored a modest 79 out of 100 in the European Partnership for Democracy’s 2025 Global Youth Participation Index, owing to a lack of youth disengagement and youth-focused policies and candidates.^[ix] Australia’s score of 64 out of 100 on the index’s political affairs dimension reflects young people’s moderate representation in parliament and party structures, an absence of youth quotas, and young people’s limited influence in leadership roles. Disillusionment with formal institutions is rising among young Australians, especially as public spending is skewed towards older demographics, despite economic pressures on younger workers.

This study investigates how and why young Australians are reshaping the political landscape. Looking at intergenerational differences in democratic engagement, the research draws implications for future political-party competition in Australia. The chapter shows that young people are increasingly willing to explore alternatives to the major parties. This signals that future parliaments will increasingly instil a balance of power in non-established minor parties and independents. But as the Australian electorate evolves to become more aligned by issue than by party, no political actor can take the youth vote for granted. Australian politicians will have to adapt to the changing policy priorities of younger generations to gain and retain support from election to election.

Dr. Intifar Chowdhury is a political scientist and youth researcher whose work focuses on strengthening democratic participation and representation among young people, combining academic research with public engagement and policy-relevant commentary.

Get to know Intifzar

Background and approach

To avoid the misunderstanding that young people are disengaging from the democratic system in Australia, it must be stressed at the outset that there is no evidence of a decline in youth commitment to democracy as a desired system of government.

This chapter focuses on generational replacement or change as the key explanation of youth engagement. People socialise politically in their formative years, when they develop certain patterns of behaviour based on their experiences in late adolescence and early adulthood. These attitudes persist throughout their lives and are resistant to change from new developments.^[x] Generational replacement occurs when younger generations, who are socialised in different historical periods, replace older cohorts.

Generational cohorts differ because of slow evolutionary change. The underlying mechanism is the accumulation of certain characteristics due to societal transformations, such as a rise in education or the development of new technologies. These transformations are different from disruptive events like wars or pandemics. The events of specific time periods can also impact democratic attitudes and behaviours, but these effects influence the entire population rather than just people in their formative years. Therefore, there is a distinction between lasting characteristics and sudden changes in political behaviour that are particular to a given cohort.

The gradual decline in political engagement across generations provides support for societal modernisation, which is a long, continuous process of transformations, rather than a one-off feature. The withdrawal from traditional practices is due to lasting generational characteristics and is not unique to one cohort, meaning it does not subsequently fade away.

This chapter highlights how Australia’s younger generations, despite being equally committed to democracy, interact with traditional political institutions, such as political parties and elites, differently from older generations. The study covers the six generations since 1915 (table 12.1).

Table 12.1. The six generations included in this study

The generational change in Australia’s electoral politics away from traditional party loyalties can be referred to as voter de-alignment. This concept describes a drift away from political parties altogether, as opposed to voter realignment, where voters shift their loyalties from one party to another.^[xi]

Features of realignment include new voting coalitions and parties winning over groups that were not previously theirs. By contrast, de-alignment is characterised by a rising number of independent candidates, declining partisan identification, and more volatile voting, where issues matter more than party loyalties in determining voters’ choices from one election to the next. When partisan weakening happens for a sustained period across generations, it reflects a lasting generational shift rather than a temporary youth rebellion that tends to moderate with age.

This chapter uses nationally representative post-election survey data from the Australian Election Study (AES), collected between 1987 and 2022, to look at political orientations, government evaluations, and voting patterns across generations.^[xii] It uses descriptive and inferential statistics to reveal generational and voter groups that are turning away from major parties. A limitation of this cohort approach is that the effects of factors such as age and time period are not isolated from generational effects. But a 2021 study attempted to separate these effects in Australia and concluded that fixed generational effects are the most important in explaining youth (dis)engagement.^[xiii]

How young people are changing politics

In terms of their political orientation, young Australians tend to be less interested in politics, more progressive or left-wing in their political views, and less knowledgeable about political facts than their predecessors (figure 12.1, top row). Meanwhile, when it comes to evaluations of governments, young people are less likely to be satisfied with democracy and less likely to trust the government than older generations (figure 12.1, bottom row).^[xiv] All generations are comparable in the differences they see between the two major political parties, the centre-left Labor Party and the centre-right Liberal Party.

Figure 12.1. Generational trends in political orientation and government evaluation

Poor evaluations of governance are also reflected in the rise in support for minor political parties and independent candidates.^[xv] In 1980, non-major groups accounted for only 8% of the vote. By 2025, this had increased to 34%, the highest share ever recorded when a major party received fewer votes than independents and minor parties.^[xvi] This trend is mirrored in Australia’s states and territories, where all jurisdictions have experienced some form of power sharing.

Although young voters remain engaged at the polls, thanks in part to compulsory voting, they are also abandoning party loyalties. Younger generations are less likely to align with a major party, less likely to consistently vote for the same party, and more likely to change their voting intention during election campaigns (figure 12.2).^[xvii]

Figure 12.2. Partisan stability and vote switching by generation

The decrease in the major parties’ primary vote share, the rise of minor parties, the erosion of previously strong predictors of electoral choice, the increase in issue-based voting, and the increase in swing and undecided voters all point to a fragmented but more responsive electorate. The decline in the number of people who identify with a political party provides stark evidence of voter volatility and partisan de-alignment.

Alongside these trends, the political context of each election is crucial. Over the period of the AES, voting decisions have increasingly been driven by policy issues, with 48% of all Australians surveyed from 1996 to 2022 citing these as the primary factor (figure 12.3). This is followed by party affiliation (29%), party leaders (14%), and local candidates (9%). In 2022, 54% of voters reported policy issues as the main factor that influenced their vote choice. Across the generations, Gen Z is more issue aligned than party aligned.

Figure 12.3. Most important factors in voting decisions by generation

These findings support the societal modernisation theory and the cognitive mobilisation thesis that a changing social context is characterised by long-term societal transformations that encourage young people to withdraw from traditional democratic processes.^[xviii] As a result, there is conclusive evidence that the modern-day democrat is assertive, demanding, and punitive. Today’s young people are fluid citizens who change their party loyalties and act based on political issues that directly impact their lives.

Why young people are changing politics

The reason young people’s politics have changed is that young Australians today face a vastly different set of challenges from their parents and grandparents. While they may earn more in nominal terms than previous generations, today’s young people are burdened by rising living costs, escalating education expenses, insecure employment, and growing debt.^[xix] Structural shifts in the economy and the labour market have reshaped young adulthood, delaying key milestones like homeownership, long-term partnerships, and parenthood.

University participation has increased, but so too has student debt – well beyond what was envisaged when Australia introduced the Higher Education Contribution Scheme in 1989 as a fair, income-contingent loan system.^[xx] Indexation has historically outpaced wage growth, leaving today’s 20-somethings with debts over A$10,000 (US$7,000) – higher in real terms than their counterparts two decades ago. Credential inflation has transformed the job market, with even low-wage roles now requiring a university degree.^[xxi] Many graduates find themselves in jobs unrelated to their qualifications, with job mismatch rates among 25-year-olds rising from 28.5% in 1996 to 33% by 2019.^[xxii]

Housing affordability has also deteriorated. In 2000, the average house in Australia cost around nine times the average household income; by 2024, that figure had risen to 16.4 times.^[xxiii] Since 2001, property prices have outpaced incomes by a factor of 2.3.^[xxiv] This was driven in part by tax incentives like the capital gains tax discount introduced in 1999 by the government of Prime Minister John Howard and, more recently, by demand in the era of the Covid-19 pandemic.^[xxv] While schemes like the First Home Owner Grant offer some support, saving for a deposit remains a years-long challenge for most.

For many in Australia, intergenerational wealth is now the key to homeownership. Since 2002, the total value of wealth transfers has more than doubled in real terms, with inheritances expected to quadruple by 2050.^[xxvi] Yet because parental wealth is unevenly distributed, inheritance is set to deepen inequality within the youth cohort.

In short, young Australians are staying younger for longer. The traditional path to adulthood – stable work, savings, and homeownership – has been disrupted and delayed. It is no surprise, then, that many young people feel let down by government policy. According to the 2024 Australian Youth Barometer, 62% believe they will be worse off than their parents.^[xxvii] As for different generations’ perceptions of the national economy (figure 12.4, top row) and of household finances (figure 12.4, bottom row), Gen Z seem to be most unimpressed by the impact of government policies.

Figure 12.4. Perceptions of the national economy and of household finances by generation

Implications for party politics

Australia’s demographic shift has enabled the Greens to capitalise on generational replacement as younger voters gradually displace older generations at the polls. Young people’s de-alignment away from the major parties represents a critical disadvantage to the centre right.^[xxviii] Meanwhile, Labor has positioned itself as the preferred party in Australia’s two-party system when it comes to addressing these critical issues, alongside the rising cost of living.

Across the generations, the Coalition partners – the Liberal Party and the centre-right National Party – have become increasingly unfavourable as younger generations tend to feel more positively towards left-of-centre parties (figure 12.5). With centre-left issues gaining traction, the Coalition is likely to see a further erosion of its support among younger voters.^[xxix]

Figure 12.5. Generational trends in feelings towards political parties

Conclusion

Australia’s younger generations are reshaping the country’s politics not only through their values but also through their lived experiences. Members of Gen Z, like their millennial predecessors, are navigating a delayed and disrupted transition to adulthood, marked by insecure work, rising debt, unaffordable housing, and climate change anxiety.^[xxx] These conditions have fuelled disillusionment with the major parties and driven a shift towards issue-based, swing voting. In a political landscape where stability feels out of reach, young Australians are demanding something different, and their politics are starting to reflect it.

The root cause of youth disengagement from major parties may be the fact that generational change was not accompanied by political reform, widening the gap between the elites and the underrepresented. Unlike previous generations, today’s young people hold more postmaterialist and progressive values and are less likely to align with political parties. Instead, they choose to act based on specific issues, like climate change, education equity, and housing affordability – issues often sidelined by mainstream parties.

This benefits minor parties, but in a two-party system like Australia’s, young voters’ shift away from major parties has significant implications. It must be acknowledged that disengagement in any form is not good news for democracy. Young citizens may choose to disengage and remain apathetic, perhaps because of a reduced belief in the efficacy of the government system. However, disillusionment leads to misrepresentation, and this is harmful both for young constituents and for the overall health of the democratic system.

This disconnect highlights a deeper problem: traditional institutions, such as political parties, are failing to adapt to the priorities of younger generations. The entry of a younger, more diverse electorate will influence political priorities. If parties fail to respond to voters’ concerns, there is a growing risk of political disengagement or backlash, particularly through support for minor parties and independents. There were already signs of this in the 2022 federal election, and again in the 2025 election, when the primary vote in the lower house was divided almost evenly three ways between Labor, the Coalition, and minor parties and independents.^[xxxi]

To stay in the game, major parties need major resets. Party systems are highly adaptive and have done this before. An influential 1967 perspective that described the evolution of democratic party systems focused on cleavages: the deep social, economic, and cultural divisions that structure political competition and shape the emergence of key party units.^[xxxii] For example, labour parties emerged to represent working-class interests. With younger generations quite distinct from older ones in their economic and social experiences and prospects, a new generational cleavage has emerged. Younger and older voters have different policy priorities, which shape new political divisions and party strategies. What is more, these priorities change from election to election.

In the immediate future, Australia may well see more minority governments and a fragmentation of the two-party system. A big challenge for the country’s major parties is to take the pulse of the nation, which now comprises a more volatile voter base, to build and then rebuild coalitions of electoral support at each contest.

Explore the Full Study

This chapter is part of a Deep Dive of Young Researchers who worked on Youth Participation for three years. This deep dive is a global collection of 12 case studies unpacking how young people are reshaping political engagement.

The Young Researchers’ Network is an initiative developed in the framework of the European Democracy Hub and EPD’s Women and Youth in Democracy WYDE Civic Engagement project, supported by the European Union.

Get to know the 12 Young Researchers

[i] Filip Kostelka and André Blais, “The Generational and Institutional Sources of the Global Decline in Voter Turnout”, World Politics 73, no. 4 (2021): 629–67; Gerardo Berthin, “Why Are Youth Dissatisfied with Democracy?”, Perspectives, Freedom House, 14 September 2023.

[ii] Jamie Morris, “‘It’s a vicious cycle why many young people don’t vote’”, BBC News, 28 June 2024.

[iii] Bastian Herre, “Young People Are Less Likely to Vote than Older People — Often Considerably So”, Our World in Data, 3 July 2024.

[iv] Ruth Dassonneville and Marc Hooghe, “Voter Turnout Decline and Stratification: Quasi-Experimental and Comparative Evidence of a Growing Educational Gap”, Politics 37, no. 2 (2017): 184–200.

[v] André Blais et al., “Where Does Turnout Decline Come From?”, European Journal of Political Research 43, no. 2 (2004): 221–36.

[vi] Ruth Dassonneville and Ian McAllister, “Explaining the Decline of Political Trust in Australia”, Australian Journal of Political Science 56, no. 3 (2021): 280–97.

[vii] Sarah Cameron, “Government Performance and Dissatisfaction with Democracy in Australia”, Australian Journal of Political Science 55, no. 2 (2020): 170–90.

[viii] Bill Browne and Minh Ngoc Le, “The Steady Decline of Voters Choosing the Major Parties Is Reshaping Australian Politics”, Australia Institute, 24 October 2024; Skye Predavec, “The 2025 Federal Election Is the First Where a Major Party Received Fewer Votes than Independents and Minor Parties”, Australia Institute, 4 June 2025.

[ix] “Explore Youth Participation in Australia”, Global Youth Participation Index, European Partnership for Democracy, 2025.

[x] Mark N. Franklin, Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established Democracies Since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

[xi] Paul Webb and Tim Bale, “Understanding Electoral Change: Realignment or Dealignment?”, in The Modern British Party System, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021).

[xii] Ian McAllister et al., “Australian Election Study Integrated Time Series Data”, ADA Dataverse, V3, 2024, https://doi.org/10.26193/HJ3KT1.

[xiii] Intifar S. Chowdhury, “Are Young Australians Turning Away from Democracy?”, Australian Journal of Political Science 56, no. 2 (2021): 171–88.

[xiv] Cameron, “Government Performance”; Dassonneville and McAllister, “Explaining”.

[xv] Cameron, “Government Performance”; Browne and Le, “The Steady Decline”.

[xvi] Predavec, “The 2025 Federal Election”.

[xvii] Intifar S. Chowdhury, “Every Generation Thinks They Had It the Toughest, but for Gen Z, They’re Probably Right”, The Conversation, 21 March 2025.

[xviii] Russell J. Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan, and Paul A. Beck, Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Russell J. Dalton, The Apartisan American: Dealignment and Changing Electoral Politics (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2013).

[xix] Chowdhury, “Every Generation”.

[xx] Greg Jericho and Jack Thrower, “People are starting with much larger HECS/HELP debts than in the past – and it is only going to get worse”, Off the Charts, Australia Institute, 23 April 2024.

[xxi] Tom Karmel, “The Return to Education – An Occupational Perspective”, Mackenzie Research Institute, November 2023.

[xxii] Derby Voon and Paul W. Miller, “Undereducation and Overeducation in the Australian Labour Market”, Economic Record 81 (2005): S22–S33; Intifar S. Chowdhury, Ben Edwards, and Andrew Norton, “Youth Education Decisions and Occupational Misalignment and Mismatch: Evidence from a Representative Cohort Study of Australian Youth”, Oxford Review of Education 50, no. 5 (2024): 727–47.

[xxiii] Greg Jericho, “The ‘Good Old Days’ for Housing Affordability Were Just Four Years Ago – Here’s Why”, Grogonomics, Guardian, 14 March 2024.

[xxiv] Greg Jericho, “It’s Time We Asked: What Is the Cost Not Just to the Budget, but to Society, When the Richest Are Helped to Get Richer?”, Grogonomics, Guardian, 27 February 2025.

[xxv] Gavin Wood, “Sustaining Home Ownership in the 21st Century: Emerging Policy Concerns”, Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, 26 April 2012.

[xxvi] “Wealth Transfers and Their Economic Effects”, Australian Government Productivity Commission, November 2021.

[xxvii] Lucas Walsh et al., “The 2024 Australian Youth Barometer”, Centre for Youth Policy and Education Practice, Monash University, 2024.

[xxviii] Ian McAllister, “Party Explanations for the 2022 Australian Election Result”, Australian Journal of Political Science 58, no. 4 (2023): 309–25.

[xxix] Predavec, “The 2025 Federal Election”; Intifar S. Chowdhury, “This Election, Young People Held the Most Political Power. Here’s How They Voted”, The Conversation, 16 May 2025.

[xxx] Chowdhury, “Every Generation”; Jericho, “It’s Time”; Jericho and Thrower, “People are starting”.

[xxxi] Predavec, “The 2025 Federal Election”; Frank Bongiorno, “Splits, Fusions and Evolutions: How Australia’s Political Parties Took Hold”, The Conversation, 13 February 2025.

[xxxii] Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (editors), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (New York: The Free Press, 1967).

The post Chapter 12 by Intifar Chowdhury first appeared on Youth Democracy Cohort.

Can Democratic Elitism Explain Bhutan’s Minimal Youth Political Participation?

Ever since Bhutan’s introduction of democracy in 2008, a recurring question has been why so few young people are involved in the country’s politics. A 2018 study observed that even students of political science do not see politics as “something that they can care about”.^[i] The need for a more realistic approach to encouraging youth political engagement has been raised time and again.

Bhutan has a respectable record in the European Partnership for Democracy’s 2025 Global Youth Participation Index (GYPI), with an overall score of 63 out of 100.^[ii] A closer analysis, however, underlines the recurrent challenge of how to boost the political participation of young Bhutanese. While Bhutan’s score of 81 out of 100 on the index’s socioeconomic dimension pushes the country’s average upwards, the score for political affairs is a meagre 55 out of 100.

With an estimated 51% of its population of almost 800,000 under the age of 30, Bhutan is a youthful nation.^[iii] The puzzle of why a country with a large young population has such low youth engagement can be studied in the context of Bhutan’s strict eligibility criteria for parliamentary candidates.

Bhutan’s parliament consists of the Druk Gyalpo (the monarch), the National Council, and the National Assembly.^[iv] The National Council has 25 members: five eminent persons nominated by the Druk Gyalpo and one elected member from each of the country’s 20 districts.

In August 2022, the Election Commission of Bhutan adopted a rule requiring candidates for the National Council to have at least 10 years of professional experience, and candidates for the National Assembly to have five or more years’ experience.^[v] These criteria were in addition to the existing constitutional provision of a minimum age of 25 as well as the 2008 election act, which required all candidates to have an undergraduate degree.

The requirement of professional experience points to an elitist approach to democracy. As young people necessarily have fewer years of experience than their older counterparts, the 10-year rule for the National Council effectively made electoral politics the preserve of older, educated adults. As a result, youth participation in Bhutan’s mainstream politics remained low.

Drawing on the stories of four aspiring parliamentary candidates, this chapter reveals how Bhutan’s strict experience requirement cancels out the successes of young people’s initial political socialisation.

Dechen Rabgyal is an author and aspiring social scientist whose work draws on his rural Bhutanese upbringing and international education to examine public policy challenges and socio-political change in Bhutan.

Get to know Dechen

Methodology

To explain the minimal level of political participation among young people in Bhutan, this study focuses on the concept of democratic elitism. Elitism is understood here to refer to an outlook that favours those with good educational qualifications and a high level of professional experience.

Through this lens, the study examines the factors that affect youth participation in Bhutan’s electoral politics. The research brought together four aspiring National Council candidates, including one former National Council member. None of the participants could run for election as they did not meet the 10-year experience criterion.

All four research participants took part in semistructured interviews that allowed for a deeper understanding of the respondents’ beliefs, attitudes, and opinions. Three of the participants also engaged in a focus group discussion, which provided exposure to group language and narratives by exploring specific topics among people of similar backgrounds and experiences.^[vi] Held virtually, the discussion covered youth political participation, young people’s motivations to run for office, and the implications of recent electoral laws.

To maintain their confidentiality, the four participants were given the pseudonyms Dawa, Karma, Norbu, and Phuntsho.

Bhutan’s election rules

The rule of law is a foundation for any democratic polity. As one interviewee, Phuntsho, stated: “Laws should create enabling conditions for people to exercise agency and rationality, enabling youth political participation … to influence policies and programmes.” In that context, procedural incentives are important to promote young people’s participation.^[vii]

In Bhutan, clear election procedures were established by the country’s constitution, which requires members of the National Council to be at least 25 years old, and the 2008 election act, which made it compulsory for candidates to have an undergraduate degree. The latter criterion emphasised the need for parliamentarians to have subject-matter expertise to be better able to study policies and legislation.^[viii] This provision disappointed former representatives who had served in the old National Assembly between 1953 and 2007, as “they saw no place for themselves in the new parliamentary setup”.^[ix]

When a draft of the 2008 election act was adopted the previous year, only 16,000 of the country’s then 634,000 inhabitants had an undergraduate degree.^[x] This shows that the law represented an elitist approach to democracy: formal education was equated with competence, making democratic processes an arena for the qualified few – the academic elite.

In each of the three National Council elections held from 2007 to 2018, the largest group of candidates consisted of those under the age of 35. These candidates are likely to have had less than 10 years’ professional experience, as most Bhutanese are around 23–24 when they complete their first university degree. In 2007–08, 19 out of 52 candidates were aged 25–29. By contrast, in the 2023 election, the first held after the introduction of the 10-year rule, there were no candidates in this age range (figure 11.1).

Figure 11.1. Number of candidates in National Council elections by age, 2007–23

In the elections before 2023, some younger candidates were able to oust their older counterparts (figure 11.2).^[xi] As long as younger candidates met Bhutan’s high legal benchmarks, informal societal norms and expectations did not prevent young Bhutanese from running for office.

Figure 11.2. Number of elected National Council members by age, 2007–23

Empowerment versus elitism

Engagement in civic and community projects encourages political participation.^[xii] In Bhutan, democracy and civic-education programmes play an important role in socialising young people into mainstream politics. For example, Phuntsho was a member of the Youth Initiative launched in 2014 by the Bhutan Centre for Media Democracy. Modelled on youth parliaments in other countries, the initiative aimed to nurture and empower young people.^[xiii]

In 2015, the election commission established the Bhutan Children’s Parliament (BCP) to foster the country’s future parliamentarians. The BCP’s members were elected from democracy clubs established in 2012.^[xiv] However, the national parliament questioned the legitimacy of the BCP, which also suffered from the apprehension of its youth parliamentarians and criticism that Bhutan’s education system was being politicised.^[xv]

Despite these initiatives, youth participation in Bhutan’s mainstream politics, such as elections, remained low. In the first round of the 2013 National Assembly election, only 26.6% of those aged 18–30 cast their vote. Five years later, 21.7% of those between the ages of 18 and 24 turned out to vote.^[xvi] In the GYPI, Bhutan’s score for youth voter turnout was a meagre 21 out of 100, against a global average of 41.^[xvii]

The 2022 rule change therefore came at a time when youth enthusiasm in mainstream politics – in terms of voter turnout – was already low. The 10-year work experience requirement made Bhutan’s electoral laws more restrictive and turned electoral politics into the mainstay of a gerontocracy that undermined the younger generation while protecting the old.^[xviii] The pre-existing requirements of a minimum age limit of 25 and an undergraduate degree were already high benchmarks.^[xix] As early as 2019, critics had argued for the removal of the requirement of an undergraduate degree.^[xx]

Yet Bhutanese lawmakers and authorities have a deep-seated inclination towards an elitist, competence-based approach to democracy. Back in 2007, the National Assembly proposed that candidates should have at least eight to 10 years of work experience. The proposal was turned down, as a 10-year experience rule would have taken the effective minimum age to 34, since most Bhutanese complete their undergraduate studies at 23 or 24. This would have been at odds with the constitutional requirement of a lower age limit of 25.

In 2014, the National Council similarly proposed requiring its members, except for incumbents, to have 10 years’ work experience, with the aim of ensuring that members had the competence to review draft legislation.^[xxi] According to one analysis, the proposal had “heavy overtones of elitism and an air of preserving the old boys’ club”.^[xxii] Again, the National Assembly decided against introducing the requirement.^[xxiii]

Experience over aspiration

The 2022 rule made several aspiring candidates ineligible for election. Supporters of the new rule argued that professional experience would bring mature, well-educated, capable people with real-life professional experience into Bhutan’s legislature.^[xxiv] According to one former member of the National Council, intellectual competence and professional integrity come with age.^[xxv] There were concerns that the previous system had allowed well-connected candidates, who were not necessarily the most capable, to be elected.^[xxvi]

Young people were seen as lacking the competencies needed to shoulder the burdens of parliamentary office.^[xxvii] The rule change to privilege older, more mature, more capable, and more experienced candidates was supposedly geared towards maintaining democratic stability and coherent public policy, an approach best explained as an example of elitism.^[xxviii]

Young Bhutanese never lacked motivation to run for public office. One interviewee, Karma, had left a postgraduate studies opportunity to stand in the 2023 National Council election. Norbu, a former National Council member, said: “I was prepared to [stand for election again] to serve the people with more experience and maturity.” For Phuntsho, his engagement in various social activities and volunteerism awakened his political consciousness. Three interviewees – Karma, Dawa, and Phuntsho – were politically socialised and driven by their respective desires to contribute to decision-making, change political outcomes, and pursue the common good.

Yet for all four interviewees, their ambitions were quashed by the new rule. Norbu’s skills and knowledge from his previous term in office, Karma’s social capital and network, Phuntsho’s aspiration to influence political outcomes, and Dawa’s commitment to duty – all factors that encouraged political participation – were swept aside by the fact that they did not meet the professional experience requirement. The new rule inadvertently became anathema to the would-be candidates’ processes of political socialisation. The focus on professional experience solidified Bhutanese lawmakers’ long-standing assumption of a strong link between competence and age. Leadership skills and youthful dynamism were seen as mutually exclusive.

The 2022 rule change challenged parliamentary supremacy and became more powerful than the 2008 election act, as the numbers of candidates and elected members in the 2023 National Council election confirm.^[xxix] There were only two candidates under the age of 35, one of whom was elected.

The implications of the rule change on the motivations of young Bhutanese were significant. In the words of Dawa: “It felt like everything vanished overnight.” He continued: “The rule affected my enthusiasm, my energy … it was all drained out … I do not think we would have the same energy to come and contest in the elections [in the future].” Phuntsho reflected: “I could not participate, but that is it. It was not the end of everything for me.” But he went on to say: “I do not think I will be joining politics anymore.”

Norbu, however, said: “I will contest future elections with more experience and exposure.” The impact of structural constraints on young people’s political engagement is therefore not universal, as Norbu’s persistence attests. Yet of the four interviewees, three were discouraged from participating in future. Bhutan’s elitist approach to election rules, and to politics in general, looks set to have an effect on young people’s long-term commitment to public service and political office.

Conclusion

Young people have been referred to as “standby citizens”.^[xxx] Their low levels of political engagement have been attributed to unequal access to social services, a lack of political influence, and a lack of trust in political parties and politicians. The political climate and the discourse of youth engagement in Bhutan are no different from elsewhere, albeit with a unique national context.

Even before 2022, the minimum requirements for Bhutanese wanting to run for elected office – a lower age limit of 25 and an undergraduate degree – already set a high bar. Still, before the new rule was adopted requiring 10 years’ professional experience, the largest group of candidates for National Council elections consisted of those under 35 years of age, who may not necessarily have had 10 years of experience. Indeed, democracy and civic-education programmes, a sense of duty, and a motivation to serve all empowered young people to run for political office.

However, the requirement of 10 years’ work experience has made elected office a stronghold of the experienced and educated few, an outcome best explained as an elitist approach to democracy. Young people, previously keen to run for office, are left disappointed, and their motivation to take part in future elections may be affected. This trend, with its outcome of lower political participation, effectively cancels out young people’s gains from their initial political socialisation, the benefits of which would otherwise increase as democracy matures. At the same time, voter turnout among young Bhutanese continues to be lower than the global average.

Future research could build on this study by broadening the sample size to include not only the National Council but also the National Assembly. The impact of the 2022 rule on young people’s motivation and the composition of Bhutan’s two houses of parliament could be studied comparatively to gauge parliamentary dynamics, political participation, and the broader impact on democracy.

Further, a quantitative approach could generate data on correlation and causation, which would provide a better understanding of the impacts of legislative interventions such as eligibility criteria on youth participation. This would be an important lens through which to assess the expectation that democracy becomes more representative, participatory, and competent as it takes root.

Explore the Full Study

This chapter is part of a Deep Dive of Young Researchers who worked on Youth Participation for three years. This deep dive is a global collection of 12 case studies unpacking how young people are reshaping political engagement.

The Young Researchers’ Network is an initiative developed in the framework of the European Democracy Hub and EPD’s Women and Youth in Democracy WYDE Civic Engagement project, supported by the European Union.

Get to know the 12 Young Researchers

[i] Siok Sian Pek-Dorji, “Youth and Politics in an Evolving Democracy”, The Druk Journal 4, no. 1 (2018): 72–8, https://drukjournal.bt/youth-and-politics-in-an-evolving-democracy/.

[ii] “Country Profiles: Bhutan”, Global Youth Participation Index, European Partnership for Democracy, 2025, https://gypi.epd.eu/country-reports/bt.

[iii] “Population Projections Bhutan 2017-2047”, Bhutanese National Statistics Bureau, 2019, https://www.nsb.gov.bt/publications/census-report/.

[iv] According to their functions, the National Council may be considered equivalent to the upper house in a western political system and the National Assembly to the lower house. However, no reference is made to upper and lower houses in the Bhutanese context.

[v] “Rules on Elections Conduct in the Kingdom of Bhutan”, vol. 4.3.3.1, Election Commission of Bhutan, 2022, https://www.ecb.bt/Rules/conductofelections.pdf.

[vi] Lokanath Mishra, “Focus Group Discussion in Qualitative Research”, TechnoLearn: An International Journal of Educational Technology 6, no. 1 (2016): 1–5, https://doi.org/10.5958/2249-5223.2016.00001.2.

[vii] Jan Teorell, “Political Participation and Three Theories of Democracy: A Research Inventory and Agenda”, European Journal of Political Research 45, no. 5 (2006): 787–810, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00636.x.

[viii] “Bhutan National Human Development Report: Ten Years of Democracy in Bhutan”, Parliament of Bhutan and United Nations Development Programme, 2019, https://hdr.undp.org/system/files/documents/nhdr-2019ii.pdf.

[ix] Kunzang Wangdi, “Growing up with Modern Bhutan”, Cho Sid Public Policy Publications and Studies, 2024.

[x] “Bhutan (Gyelyong Tshogde) Elections in 2007”, Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2025, http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2036_07.htm.

[xi] Needrup Zangpo, “Bhutan’s National Council Election 2023: A Setback for Women”, Friedrich Naumann Foundation, 29 June 2023, https://www.freiheit.org/south-asia/bhutans-national-council-election-2023-setback-women.

[xii] Teorell, “Political Participation”.

[xiii] Dechen Rabgyal, Youth Civic Engagement: Concepts, Agents, Reflections and Empowerment (Trashigang: Sherubtse College, 2018).

[xiv] Wangdi, “Growing up”.

[xv] Pek-Dorji, “Youth and Politics”.

[xvi] Dechen Rabgyal, “Forces Shaping Bhutan’s Young Social Capital”, The Druk Journal 7, no. 1 (2021): 118–26, https://drukjournal.bt/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Forces-Shaping-Bhutans-Young-Social-Capital.pdf.

[xvii] “Bhutan”, European Partnership for Democracy.

[xviii] Dechen Rabgyal, “From Votes to Voices: Socialise Politics and Normalise Public Affairs to Address Bhutan’s ‘Democratic Dilemma’”, Dechen Rabgyal, 30 October 2022, https://www.dechenrabgyal.com/2022/10/30/from-votes-to-voices-socialise-politics-and-normalise-public-affairs-to-address-bhutans-democratic-dilemma/; Yeshey Lhaden, “10 Years Work Experience Mandatory to Contest for National Council – BBSCL”, BBSCL, 30 January 2014, https://www.bbs.bt/36769/.

[xix] Tenzing Lamsang, “Ruling and Opposition Parties Uneasy with ECB’s New Rules on Experienced Candidates and Showing Money for Pledges but 3 Other Parties Welcome It”, Bhutanese, 3 September 2022, https://thebhutanese.bt/ruling-and-opposition-parties-uneasy-with-ecbs-new-rules-on-experienced-candidates-and-showing-money-for-pledges-but-3-other-parties-welcome-it/.

[xx] “Bhutan”, Parliament of Bhutan.

[xxi] Lhaden, “10 Years”; “Proceedings and Resolutions of the Twelfth Session”, National Council of Bhutan, 2014.

[xxii] “House of Review Needs to Review Its Experience Criteria”, Bhutanese, 15 February 2014, https://thebhutanese.bt/house-of-review-needs-to-review-its-experience-criteria/.

[xxiii] “Proceedings and Resolutions of the National Assembly of Bhutan: Second Parliament of Bhutan, Fourth Session”, National Assembly of Bhutan, 2014; “Proceedings and Resolutions of the Thirteenth Session”, National Council of Bhutan, 2014.

[xxiv] Zangpo, “Bhutan’s National Council Election 2023”; Lamsang, “Ruling and Opposition Parties”.

[xxv] Pema Choki, “The Increasingly Important Role of the National Council over the Last 15 Years”, Bhutanese, 2023, https://thebhutanese.bt/the-increasingly-important-role-of-the-national-council-over-the-last-15-years/.

[xxvi] Nidup Lhamo, “Seminar Participants Question ECB on New Rules”, Business Bhutan, 24 October 2022, https://businessbhutan.bt/seminar-participants-question-ecb-on-new-rules/.

[xxvii] Jack L. Walker, “A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy”, American Political Science Review 60, no. 2 (1966): 285–95, https://doi.org/10.2307/1953356.

[xxviii] Fredrik Engelstad, “Democratic Elitism – Conflict and Consensus”, Comparative Sociology 8, no. 3 (2009): 383–401, https://doi.org/10.1163/156913309×447585; Robert A. Dahl, “Further Reflections on ‘the Elitist Theory of Democracy’”, American Political Science Review 60, no. 2 (1966), 296–305, https://doi.org/10.2307/1953357.

[xxix] Kinley Wangchuk, From Armed Parliamentarians to Peaceful Debates: Principles and Practices of Bhutan’s Democracy (Thimphu: Kinley Wangchuk, 2024).

[xxx] Erik Amnå and Joakim Ekman, “Standby Citizens: Diverse Faces of Political Passivity”, European Political Science Review 6, no. 2 (2014): 261–81, https://doi.org/10.1017/s175577391300009x.

The post Chapter 11 by Dechen Rabgyal first appeared on Youth Democracy Cohort.

After becoming a nation-state, Afghanistan experienced several waves of attempts at democratisation. The last major effort began in December 2001, when a republican political system re-emerged in the country. Over the following 20 years, until the system’s collapse in August 2021, the people of Afghanistan became increasingly familiar with free speech, elections, and the rule of law, although each of these elements faced significant challenges.

During that period, both men and women hoped for a better Afghanistan and saw education, creativity, and dedication to their goals as vital for social advancement and individual emancipation. A dramatic change occurred when forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the United States (US) withdrew in 2021, leading to the Taliban’s return to power.^[i]

Many people initially assumed that the Taliban, in their second period in power, might adopt a milder and more democratic approach. This expectation was based on the belief that Afghanistan could no longer be governed as it had been from 1994 to 2001, when the Taliban were first in charge. However, this expectation proved short-lived. After March 2022, the Taliban gradually began enforcing their rigid interpretation of religious texts and ideology, building on earlier measures, like a ban on girls’ secondary education. The Taliban imposed restrictions on every aspect of political and social life, initially through informal verbal edicts, which later evolved into formal decrees that are still in force today.^[ii]

In this ongoing restrictive environment, where young people have been disproportionately affected by the erosion of democratic norms and civic values, three questions emerge. First, how do young Afghans employ artistic and non-artistic forms of expression to communicate their perspectives and civic ideas without provoking violent retaliation from Taliban rule? Second, what risk-management strategies make such expression viable? And third, what channels and methods do young people use to try to ensure their voices are heard, even in a limited way, under these repressive conditions?

Wasal Naser Faqiryar is a PhD Candidate at Notre Dame University. He pursued his BA in Law and Political Science at Kabul University. Wasal is a co-founder of the Rumi Organisation for Research, with expertise spanning politics, security, and development, and a strong commitment to supporting Afghan youth through academic and research initiatives.

Get to know Wasal

Methodology

This research used a mixed-methods, cross-sectional survey to examine strategies of youth expression under Taliban rule. This approach enabled the systematic documentation of diverse forms of expression, the perceived risks of different communication methods, and the channels through which young Afghans attempt to ensure their voices reach their intended audiences.

A total of 207 participants aged 15–24 took part in the study. The sample included both female and male respondents; 87% were female. The median age was 20. Data was collected electronically through an online survey platform from 22 to 26 September 2025. The survey was distributed through social networks and educational communities that were accessible to young Afghans. Participation was entirely voluntary and anonymous, with no personal information collected beyond the basic demographic characteristics of age and sex. This method was chosen to ensure participants’ safety and encourage honest responses, given the sensitive political context.

Quantitative data was analysed using descriptive statistics appropriate to each data type. Participants’ qualitative responses in Persian, Pashto, and English from open-ended questions were also analysed. This combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches provides a broad and deep understanding of the complex situation facing the young people of Afghanistan. The primary survey data was supplemented by secondary literature.

A limitation of this research is that responses are likely to have been completed primarily by young people living in urban areas who have internet access and take part in educational programmes, potentially excluding the perspectives of those in Afghanistan’s rural regions.

Quantitative findings

Young people in Afghanistan are at a crossroads of social, political, and economic struggles. Among these, the struggle for self-expression seems to be the most challenging, as the regime deploys several mechanisms to gradually indoctrinate society into following its ideology.^[iii] Of the young Afghans surveyed, 69.6% said the Taliban completely or mostly restricted their self-expression, with only 8.2% perceiving slight restrictions or none at all (figure 9.1).

Figure 9.1. Young people’s perceptions of Taliban restrictions on self-expression

Asked how comfortable they felt expressing their social and political opinions to their families and friends, participants said they were more at ease with family than with friends (figure 9.2). Between 55% and 60% of respondents reported feeling comfortable discussing social and political issues with their families, versus 44–53% with their friends, suggesting that the family is young people’s primary safe space. Across both contexts, respondents felt slightly safer discussing social topics than political ones.

Figure 9.2. Young people’s levels of comfort when discussing social and political views

As for the Taliban’s receptiveness and whether they listen to young people, the data shows an overwhelming sense of pessimism. Of those surveyed, 91–93% believed that the Taliban did not listen to their suggestions for change (figure 9.3). This reflects a near-unanimous feeling about the Taliban’s authoritarian rule and refusal to engage with youth voices. Political suggestions fared slightly worse than social ones, indicating that young Afghans believe the Taliban are marginally more closed to political than social input.

Figure 9.3. Young people’s perceptions of whether the Taliban listen to youth voices

The data also shows a massive trust deficit, indicating profound political alienation. Very few young people surveyed believed that Afghanistan’s supreme leader trusted their social or political opinions (figure 9.4). The significant proportion of those who were uncertain about this question – around one-fifth – could reflect several dynamics. Given the regime’s authoritarian nature, where rights are granted rather than guaranteed, this uncertainty might reflect a cautious hope in a context of pervasive mistrust; alternatively, it might indicate confusion about whether any trust exists at all under such opaque governance.

Figure 9.4. Young people’s perceptions of whether the supreme leader trusts youth opinions

Despite the negative perceptions, restrictions, and overwhelming evidence that the Taliban do not listen to young people, nearly two-thirds of those surveyed maintained hope about their potential to influence change (figure 9.5). This paradox suggests resilient optimism or a belief in long-term change despite the current restrictions. The minimal proportion of respondents who disagreed or strongly disagreed with the idea that they can influence change shows that most young Afghans have not given up on their sense of agency.

Figure 9.5. Young people’s belief in their ability to influence positive change under the Taliban

Finally, young Afghans overwhelmingly view art as a powerful alternative channel of expression under restrictive conditions (figure 9.6). The large percentage of those who rated art as effective shows a remarkable consensus on the value of art as a way for young people to voice their concerns.

Figure 9.6. Young people’s perceptions of the effectiveness of art for expressing their concerns

Art in Afghanistan today faces a difficult and tense situation. It is pushed and pulled between two forces, sometimes accepted or praised, sometimes punished or banned. On the one hand, positive art that shows behaviours and actions approved by the regime and gives an appearance of normal life gets the regime’s automatic approval. If art avoids controversy and supports the image of a peaceful, problem-free Afghanistan, it is left alone. On the other hand, when art even hints at rights, women, education, or journalism, or tries to advocate, campaign, resist, or question the status quo, fierce pushback follows – no matter if the artist is a citizen, a tourist, or a resident.

The resulting fear of creating art is made greater by the fact that most rules about art, speech, and behaviour are unwritten, unpredictable, and dependent on who is in power and where the art appears. Outcomes depend on local circumstances, the awareness of the artist, and the influence of those who come to their rescue. This can lead to very different results. Because of this, artists, citizens, and visitors feel lost or fearful, as expectations are clear but punishments are not.

Qualitative analysis

Standing up for civic values and ideas through any form of expression, whether artistic or non-artistic, is dangerous, threatened, and constrained under Taliban rule. Nevertheless, young Afghans make strategic use of various forms of expression while attempting to maintain the viability of these forms through careful risk management. Young people have also identified a range of channels as workable strategies to ensure their voices reach others.

Forms of youth expression

In Afghanistan today, public speeches about political affairs and social matters regulated by the Taliban are not only unsafe but also often perceived by young people as futile. As a result, young Afghans redirect their voices, ideas, dreams, and ambitions to alternative channels through which meaning can be shared while the speaker is protected.

The primary forms of expression identified by respondents include poetry, creative writing, storytelling, painting, drawing, calligraphy, photography, graphic design, handcrafts, embroidery, vlogging, music, and even narrative wishes. All of these activities are performed predominantly in private settings to minimise detection by the regime, except for non-provocative vlogging, which comprises content about daily life or routine activities, adverts, and general content creation.

These creative practices exist along a spectrum from completely private to selectively public. Several young people write under pen names and keep notebooks or notes apps with content they never share, viewing this as the safest way to preserve dangerous or private thoughts. Others choose to publish their creative work online, accepting the risks of doing so.

Digital forms of expression manifest themselves through both anonymous and non-anonymous social media accounts. The former are used predominantly by women, who tend to adopt pseudonyms in keeping with cultural norms about women’s public presence on social media, which also protects those who post criticism of the Taliban. Non-anonymous accounts are more common among men and those women who choose to display their information or pictures as online influencers.

Notably, women use social media, especially Instagram, as a hub to create and publish content on a variety of apolitical and non-social topics, gather followers, and then turn their pages into sources of income through promotions and ads. They are paid between 2,000 and 20,000 afghanis ($32–320) per Instagram post and sometimes receive the products they advertise for free, depending on how many followers they have accumulated. Young men, meanwhile, are more inclined towards creating entertaining content, showcasing infrastructure developments, documenting daily activities, and organising giveaway challenges to engage their followers.

Among the respondents, a poet in Helmand province who composes poems on the situation in Afghanistan explained that writing kept his hope alive. Another respondent identified storytelling as one of the best forms to describe the current situation and pointed to novelist Khaled Hosseini’s books The Kite Runner and A Thousand Splendid Suns as strong examples of works that portray the problems and pains of the previous Taliban period. One respondent said she had submitted poems and stories to international competitions while working on an entrepreneurship project she hoped to fund herself.

Risk-management strategies

The risk-management strategies deployed by young Afghans to make these forms of expression viable are sophisticated and multilayered, reflecting young people’s deep understanding of the surveillance state in which they live. Five strategies stand out.

The first line of defence is anonymity. Young people create fake social media accounts, use pseudonyms, hide their faces by blurring them or deliberately not displaying them, and avoid sharing clear photos that could identify them. One respondent noted that she never shared clear photos online, and that even having a LinkedIn profile with her photo and information caused her stress when strangers message her to ask about her location.

The second critical approach is indirect expression. Young Afghans use metaphors in stories, symbolic art, and drawings; frame their messages around shared cultural or religious values; speak about issues through fictional characters rather than direct commentary; and deploy humour as subtle critique. Many respondents described writing stories in which characters experience what the author feels, allowing them to discuss freedom, girls who want to study, and people who are tired but hopeful, without explicitly identifying these narratives as autobiographical.

Third, private and limited sharing ensures that expression remains within safe boundaries. Content is limited to trusted circles: home-based activities, WhatsApp groups that contain only members known to each other, private conversations with vetted friends, and personal notebooks that the writer has no intention of disseminating publicly.

Beyond these technical and content-based measures, young people employ several interpersonal and behavioural strategies to protect themselves. The fourth tactic, a particularly significant one, is strategic silence. Young people consciously choose when not to express themselves, practise rigorous self-censorship, and maintain complete silence in public spaces where a Taliban presence is likely.

Fifth, respectful communication allows young people to maintain dialogue with ideologically opposed audiences while minimising risk. This strategy involves choosing words carefully, avoiding direct confrontation with figures of authority, speaking respectfully even when fundamentally disagreeing, and connecting messages to religious principles that the Taliban cannot easily dismiss.

For example, one respondent described approaching conversations with Taliban sympathisers by emphasising shared Islamic values rather than secular rights, thereby creating space for dialogue that would otherwise be immediately shut down. Another respondent explained that the only way to persuade Taliban supporters was through mullahs, whom they deeply respect, noting that when ordinary people express the same ideas, they are accused of being non-Muslim.

In addition to these communication strategies, environmental and relational factors significantly shape young Afghans’ expression practices. The need to protect their families informs virtually all young people’s decisions to express themselves: they do not discuss activities with extended family members who might inform the Taliban; parents sometimes do not tell their colleagues about their children’s participation in online education; and young people put the safety of their families before any form of public expression.

Finally, geographic location influences people’s assessment and management of risk. Young people express themselves more freely outside Afghanistan, take greater care in provinces with a heavier Taliban presence, and are acutely aware of regional variations in the enforcement of restrictions.

Amplifying youth voices

Young Afghans use multiple interconnected channels to ensure their voices reach others despite systematic suppression. These channels can be organised into distinct yet overlapping categories that reflect both the opportunities available and the constraints imposed by the regime.

Social media platforms, particularly Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, WhatsApp, and Telegram, are primary channels for amplification. Young people create content designed for viral spread, including shareable images, emotional narratives, and symbolic artwork that resonates beyond the creators’ immediate networks.

Education settings function as channels where voices can be expressed with relative safety. These include English-language courses, computer classes, online university programmes, study circles, and volunteer teaching positions that allow facilitators to share perspectives while ostensibly delivering academic content. One respondent described her work as a volunteer teacher, in which she helped Afghan girls to access education and get psychological and educational advice from professionals while using the platform to discuss strict policies and identify solutions.

Organisations also provide structured opportunities to amplify youth voices. Young people engage through local nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and international organisations, entrepreneurship learning programmes, and civic leadership initiatives that connect young Afghans to broader audiences abroad and limited resources.

Beyond these formal channels, community spaces, though increasingly restricted, offer limited opportunities for expression. Such spaces include family gatherings where careful conversations can occur; informal home meetings with trusted participants; small, clandestine groups; and neighbourhood networks built on long-standing relationships.

Complementing these local networks, international connections have become increasingly critical as domestic space contracts. Young people contact international organisations and associations by email, take part in international competitions that provide platforms for Afghan voices, engage with foreign media, and connect with foreign and Afghan educators for online language learning, education, or even therapy.

One respondent recounted being interviewed by a Swedish journalist and speaking confidently about themselves, their future, and their country without hiding their face, despite the security risks. The resulting video reached thousands of international viewers and provided a rare moment in which courageous public expression felt possible.

Creative outlets, while severely constrained, occasionally function as channels for youth expression, though with no guarantee of continuity, as Taliban intervention can shut them down at any moment. These outlets include art exhibitions and painting or calligraphy courses that operated briefly after August 2021 before being closed in some provinces while being allowed to continue in others.

Young people are also adaptable when faced with new restrictions. They find alternative platforms when existing ones are blocked or they receive threatening messages; they adjust their content through careful linguistic choices and metaphors to avoid provocation; and they continuously evolve their methods based on ongoing risk assessments.

One respondent from Balkh province detailed how internet cuts lasting more than eight days prevented them from accessing recorded university sessions or attending online courses. These blackouts forced students to rely on expensive mobile data that limited their ability to watch recorded lectures, showing how technological restrictions directly constrain educational access and the amplification of youth voices.

Another respondent recounted posting content critical of the Taliban on their Facebook page. About a week later, the respondent received a message from someone who claimed that their statements about the Taliban were incorrect and asserted that the Taliban were good people. The message warned the recipient not to publish similar content again and threatened them with consequences. Feeling frightened by this threat, the respondent removed the post. After this incident, they changed their strategy by sharing their ideas and thoughts through poetry instead of direct statements.

Conclusion and recommendations

Young Afghans navigate a paradox of persistent agency amid profound constraint: they exhibit a sustained civic consciousness and adopt creative forms of expression even as they face systematic repression under the Taliban. Survey data shows that almost 70% of young Afghans experience severe restrictions on their self-expression, while over nine out of ten believe the Taliban do not listen to their suggestions for change. Despite this overwhelming climate of repression, nearly two-thirds of young people are still hopeful about their potential to influence change, and more than 80% view art as a powerful alternative channel for expression.

Young people in Afghanistan employ diverse forms of artistic and creative expression. These forms exist along a spectrum from completely private to selectively public. The sophisticated risk-management framework identified in this research reveals young people as strategic actors rather than passive victims.

Young Afghans use multiple interconnected channels to amplify their voices. Social media platforms serve as primary channels, with content deliberately designed for viral spread. Education settings provide secondary channels through which perspectives can be shared alongside the delivery of academic content.

Respondents in this study specifically identified strategic communication through religious frameworks as necessary when engaging with the Taliban and their supporters. As such, the international community must leverage technology to expand peaceful and open discourse through religious vlogging and the production of content that counters harmful narratives inside Afghanistan. This content must reach not only Taliban supporters but also conservative families who impose restrictions on their children, to guide them towards perspectives that benefit the country, its society, and its individuals. By documenting daily lives, concerns, hopes, and economic situations while expressing dissent on prohibited subjects, clergy and mullah vloggers can amplify popular sentiments that would otherwise remain beneath the surface.

Since August 2021, young Afghan men and women have been largely forgotten by the international community. Despite young Afghans’ engagement in creative forms of expression, fewer than five NGOs or institutions have organised art competitions in Afghanistan, and almost none has awarded significant prizes or provided the mentorship that young people in the country desperately need. The international community must fund local NGOs or establish competitions with substantial prizes for large numbers of participants to showcase the works of Afghan boys and girls. Merely producing reports on the situation in the country is not, and will never be, sufficient.

Finally, young Afghan men and women need courses to teach them content-creation techniques. These courses must help young people to produce content at global standards to transform them into ambassadors for Afghanistan on the world stage. Despite the unreliability of the country’s internet access – given a two-day nationwide internet and mobile network shutdown in September 2025 and ongoing filtering of social media – Afghans remain thirsty for knowledge and learning. Whether through YouTube, online universities, or other platforms, young Afghans place education at the forefront of their lives.

Just as substantial international support flowed into Afghanistan during the 20 years before the Taliban’s second period in power, such support is needed again. Indeed, the need is now even greater because the conditions are darker than before.

Explore the Full Study

This chapter is part of a Deep Dive of Young Researchers who worked on Youth Participation for three years. This deep dive is a global collection of 12 case studies unpacking how young people are reshaping political engagement.

The Young Researchers’ Network is an initiative developed in the framework of the European Democracy Hub and EPD’s Women and Youth in Democracy WYDE Civic Engagement project, supported by the European Union.

Get to know the 12 Young Researchers

[i] Niamatullah Ibrahimi and Arif Saba, “The Doha Agreement: A Path to Authoritarianism”, in Mapping Futures for Afghanistan, edited by Arif Saba et al. (Routledge, 2025), 70–83, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781032707518-6.

[ii] Sharif Hozoori, “Taliban 1.0 and 2.0 in Afghanistan: Same Policies, Persistent Vision”, Journal of Strategic Security 18, no. 2 (2025): 124–43, https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.18.2.2507.

[iii] Farhat Easar et al., “Education in Afghanistan since 2001: Evolutions and Rollbacks”, Rumi Organization for Research 1, no. 1 (2023): 41, https://rumi.academy/10101010101.pdf.

The post Chapter 9 by Wasal Naser Faqiryar first appeared on Youth Democracy Cohort.

Over the last decade, the United Nations (UN) system has increasingly invested in creating institutional space for greater youth participation and leadership. Launched in 2018, Youth2030 is a UN-wide youth strategy that prioritises “meaningful youth engagement in policymaking and decision-making processes”.^[i] Other efforts to systematise youth participation include the UN Youth Office, the UN Youth Envoy, and the 2024 Summit of the Future.

Attempts to reform institutional architectures to enhance meaningful youth participation have elements that are both new and old, inventive and anachronistic, symbolic and material. Indeed, current attempts to fashion institutions and processes that represent multiple generations have historical antecedents. While many of the UN’s contemporary youth engagement efforts are cast as novel, they are situated within much longer stories of the UN as an institution that is invested in involving and reaching young people.

This chapter explores the reinvention of intergenerational politics through the case study of the 1970 World Youth Assembly, held at the UN headquarters in New York. The chapter details several complex aspects of youth representation and offers three lessons for understanding youth engagement in multilateral decision-making today.

First, it is important to pay critical attention to the framings of “generation” and “youth” adopted by different actors to different ends. Examining the varying interpretations of these concepts highlights contradictory narratives that are still relevant for intergenerational politics today.

Second, it is essential to centre analyses of youth engagement in questions of power. Focusing on power enables a nuanced analysis of the intersections of representation, geopolitics, gender, class, and age in shaping the potential and limitations of youth inclusion.

Finally, this case study highlights how young people adapt inherited processes to offer more expansive conceptions of what is political. This suggests that research on youth politics must deal not only with the formal politics of youth engagement in institutions but also with the micropolitics of how young people reimagine politics more generally.

Mark Ortiz is a Presidential Postdoctoral Fellow and incoming Assistant Professor of Geography at Pennsylvania State University whose research explores youth politics, climate justice, and digital storytelling in global youth climate action

Get to know Mark

The 1970 World Youth Assembly

To commemorate the UN’s 25th anniversary in 1970, then Secretary General U Thant spearheaded a first-of-its-kind World Youth Assembly at the organisation’s headquarters in New York. Over 600 participants from some 120 countries convened in July that year to discuss a broad range of topics, such as education, peace, development, and the environment. The average participant was reported to be in their early 20s, with nearly half engaged in some sort of education or university training, and many involved in youth organisations.^[ii]

The videos, documents, and speeches that remain from the assembly form a unique archive that illustrates how the UN and its officials articulated their roles in generational language. As U Thant said in a radio broadcast before the assembly, the project’s ambition was to forge a “relationship of mutual confidence and cooperation … between generations so that we can transmit the goals and ideals with which the United Nations was brought into being a quarter of a century ago”.^[iii] Here, U Thant articulated a mission of progressive betterment intended to engender a sense of global citizenship.

Generational conflict and geopolitics

Framing this mission was a notion of nascent generational conflict. Victor Mills, the assembly’s executive officer, alluded to broad youth dissatisfaction with the sluggishness and inefficacy of institutional politics.^[iv] Similarly, in his opening remarks to the event, U Thant described the central generational fissure as being between the “older generation”, with its emphasis on the “legacy of achievements passed on to the youth of today”, and the younger generation focused on “injustice, waste, [and a] lack of love and understanding”.^[v]

Ghana’s permanent representative to the UN, R.M. Akwei, also focused parts of his speech on diagnosing a generational chasm and identifying different articulations of democratic thought. He, like Mills, mentioned a prevailing sense of frustration among young people because of the “inability of individuals to influence institutions in order to make them more humane and responsive to new social values”. He described a “virtual civil war” between an older generation interested in affluence and younger citizens critical of the “emptiness and callousness” that affluence produces.^[vi] He went on to suggest that the younger generation was interested in a vision of democracy that embraced “spontaneity”, in contrast to rigid institutions.

Speeches and historical reporting present contradictory narratives about young people that oscillate between idealism and chaos. A cautionary report for the Boston Globe in May 1970 wondered: “What happens if the gathering decides its own agenda, different from that offered? And what if it produces a psychedelic manifesto of revolution and irreverence?”^[vii] The central dialectic that emerges is of youthful idealism as either an engine of possibility or a harbinger of social breakdown.

UN Chef de Cabinet C.V. Narasimhan identified two potential pathways the assembly could take. The first was that the “the young will bring a new dimension to our own thinking about how the world should be run … and how the future affairs of mankind should be handled”. The second was a “rambunctious youth assembly” that “would end in chaos”.^[viii]

U Thant’s opening remarks leaned into an optimistic vision that framed participants as part of a long historical lineage of young people leading “inspirational” and transformational change.^[ix] Both Narasimhan’s and U Thant’s understandings of young people embodied a faith in them as progressive catalysts. But across the archival materials, a thin line distinguishes youthful idealism and innovation from the omnipresent threat of disorder.

Each stage of the assembly was animated by the geopolitical conflicts of the era, suggesting the need to take seriously power dynamics in studies of youth engagement and intergenerational politics. For example, countries disagreed over whether a youth assembly should happen at all, with one western representative reportedly suggesting that the Soviet Union was more “worried about [the] unpredictability of youth than we are”.^[x] Another report suggested that “the big powers, sensing they would be the prime targets of the youthful participants, became wary”.^[xi]

U Thant appealed to a sort of universalist generational thinking to elevate the gathering’s importance as transcending geopolitical interests. He suggested that if the event did not happen, its absence would be “likely to affect the relations between generations for a long time to come”.^[xii]

Thus, generational ideas interacted with questions of geopolitics. In western reporting, many of the delegates who represented communist-affiliated youth fronts were described as older and interested in pursuing a manipulative realpolitik. New York Times reporter Kathleen Teltsch described the discussions being dominated by “not-so-young professionals who had learned their tactics at youth festivals in various communist capitals”.^[xiii] In the same way, a write-up in Time magazine decried the presence of “professional Youths” in the conference.^[xiv] Here, depictions of young people function as sites of geopolitical contestation that distinguish subversive, not-so-young attendees from communist countries, on the one hand, from their innocent or naive counterparts from the west, on the other.

Delegates’ views

Many young attendees criticised the way their conversations unfolded along predictable lines and implored other participants to embrace a spirit of possibility. Dennis Smith from Jamaica lambasted the assembly for “quarrelling” in the way that national leaders did in the UN and suggested that the outcomes of such bickering would be “foolish”.^[xv]

Speeches by young delegates in the early stages of the assembly challenged the forum’s purported universality: there was criticism of the presence of young people selected by China’s nationalist regime, of military action by the United States (US) in Vietnam, and of global imperialism.^[xvi] Some participants withdrew from the forum entirely, including one Puerto Rican participant who cited a “climate of ideological intolerance”.^[xvii]

A delegate from Mali exhorted participants to “have faith in our capacity to persuade, in our capacity to change each of these youth into the men of tomorrow”, suggesting a promising view of the possibility of negotiation and interpersonal change. Australia’s Kenwin Smith suggested that “virtually no one has managed to break beyond the concepts of the adult generation”.^[xviii]

A young participant from the US offered a different view: “There has been an overt sign of entire chaos, but I think underneath a lot of work has been getting done.” Lars Thalen, who chaired the assembly, insisted that the role of young people was to take a “longer view” and inject politics with a future-oriented moral vision.^[xix] Overall, the participants’ experiences emphasised that young people cannot be shoehorned into reductive symbols of progressivism or future-oriented politics.

In closing the assembly, U Thant remarked that “the ideological, political, and other preoccupations of the world were bound to reflect themselves in the attitudes of youth”. His sober concluding assessment departed from the aspirational tone with which the assembly was opened and imagined. Interviews with attendees after the event painted a negative image of the affair, with one Chicago Tribune headline reading “U.N. parley disillusions youth”.^[xx] Meanwhile, an appraisal for the Boston Globe claimed that “adult cynicisms and ploys crept into the attitudes and voices of the young supplanting the dreams of a better world with polemics of the present”.^[xxi]

A Norwegian delegate quoted in the Chicago Tribune recounted being disillusioned that young people were not “more capable of international cooperation than their elders”; another delegate remembered how her “hopes sank lower and lower” as she watched the assembly unfold.^[xxii] Even amid the maelstrom of the gathering, Thalen hoped the forum would provide the basis for the creation of a “permanent channel through which youth or young people can speak to the General Assembly and to the U.N.”, indicating modest ambitions for institutional innovation.^[xxiii]

Reflections on 1970 in the context of intergenerational representation today

As U Thant remarked presciently at the closing of the 1970 World Youth Assembly, “the United Nations will probably never be the same”.^[xxiv] While the assembly’s organisers expressed an ambition that the delegates would “inject new ideas” into the conversations unfolding on the international stage, participants and news reporters converged on how congruent the assembly was with the broader geopolitics of the moment.

So, what, if anything, did the assembly accomplish, and what can scholars and practitioners interested in youth engagement today glean from this historical moment? Three lessons stand out.

The importance of framings

First, analysts must be attentive to “youth” and “generation” as symbolic constructs loaded with complex and often contradictory meanings, depending on who is using them. This results in tensions that mark young people as unsettled political subjects and materially shape the politics and possibilities of participation. While some observers extol young people as bridges to a new historical formation, the same commentators often describe the potential for youth politics to become unruly, chaotic, or destructive.

Young people are often depicted as the political foils to older adults. However, as institutions like the UN increasingly carve out space for youth participation, the contrary expectation is that young participants will inject new ideas, practices, and energies into inflexible institutional settings while embodying the norms of staid, bureaucratic dialogue.

The centrality of power

The second lesson is that any study of young people that does not take seriously questions of power will be limited in its analytical utility. As with the World Youth Assembly, in any political deliberations involving young people today, articulations of youth are key battlegrounds on which states, corporations, and other actors seek to articulate, curate, and control their images and extend their influence.

The World Youth Assembly was undeniably shaded by the great-power geopolitics of the cold war, the rising tide of decolonisation and anti-imperial insurgencies, and the countercultural youth and student movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Within today’s power dynamics, youth representation in settings like UN climate negotiations is vitiated by concerns about so-called youth-washing – the careful selection and curation of young spokespeople to exhibit representativeness, which presents potentially misleading images of governments and corporations.^[xxv]

Still, as one researcher has suggested, while youth-led change may be “partial and incomplete”, it is “always playful in the sense that it is generative and creative”.^[xxvi] While it may be impossible to trace any large-scale changes emerging from the 1970 assembly, a sense of the micropolitics of youth advocacy helps analysts understand the modest advances that emerged across the gathering. U Thant’s closing remarks alluded to some of them:

Your informal manners, the practice of certain commissions to limit the statements to five minutes or even less, the recognition of speakers by number rather than country, and most of all the principle of individual participation rather than governmental representation … all of these may affect in some way the practice of the United Nations organs in the long run.^[xxvii]

The value of history

The third finding is that as the international community pursues ever more substantive modes of intergenerational inclusion, it is essential to look back at the histories of youth and intergenerational politics in order to more perspicaciously look forward. The stories of generational tension and the divergent representations of youth that unfolded at the World Youth Assembly resembled the stories that shape multilateral negotiations, local forums, and political conversations around the world today.

The assembly’s final declaration expressed “regret that the conditions of the World Youth Assembly did not permit the participation in the Assembly of all the youth organizations and movements” and did not embody a “universal character”.^[xxviii] The document also prioritised representation of young people from the “Third World”, the importance of protections for those in work, and efforts to promote literacy among “out-of-school youth”. These priorities offer important precursors of what would become an interest in meaningful youth engagement that takes broad inclusion seriously.

The final statement also envisaged the creation of a “UN International Youth Centre” that would “work through a decentralized structure … through many local bases directly”. These modest visions, along with Thalen’s insistence on creating a more permanent platform for UN youth engagement, have stood the test of time and find their institutional forms in the youth-focused strategies and offices of today.

The current younger generation may leverage social media, digital technologies, and pop culture to articulate their political dissatisfaction.^[xxix] But the “do-it-ourselves” politics of youth climate activism in the 2010s and 2020s is not so different from the visions of democracy and shared generational consciousness expressed by many attendees back in 1970.^[xxx]

The 2024 Summit of the Future

Comparing more recent efforts to engage young people in multilateral institutions with the 1970 World Youth Assembly reveals both parallels and contrasts. One major event was the UN’s 2024 Summit of the Future, which focused on meaningful youth engagement, reflecting commitments made in the Youth2030 strategy.

Before the two-day negotiations on 22–23 September, UN Secretary General António Guterres convened two action days to set the tone for the talks. The first was entitled “#YouthLead for the Future”. Speaking at this action day, UN Assistant Secretary General for Youth Affairs Felipe Paullier described the summit as an opportunity to “put young people at the centre” of multilateral decision-making.^[xxxi]

The media that documented the summit and the preceding action days reveal a diverse range of young participants. The involvement of marginalised individuals, such as disabled people, Indigenous groups, children, and others, signalled an evolution of inclusion since 1970. Similarly, the language used in the outcome document of the 2024 event reflected a greater emphasis on generation-spanning challenges and insisted on the importance of factoring future generations into today’s decision-making.

Juxtaposing the highly curated media, interviews, and celebratory tone of the 2024 summit with the grainy, amateurish footage of the 1970 assembly, it would be tempting to believe that youth inclusion has evolved in a singularly positive direction. And indeed, the organisers of the 2024 event took strides to contribute to the aspiration expressed in the final outcome of the 1970 assembly that future gatherings should evolve towards a more “universal character”.

But today, the central question is pivoting from the mere inclusion of young people in traditionally adult-dominated meetings to more meaningful ways to link multilateral processes with transformative, youth-centred outcomes on the ground. As young climate change commentators such as Greta Thunberg have noted extensively, and as could be heard even in the youth speeches of 1970, although young people may be at the table, too often the words, promises, and commitments of older political figures do little to enable intergenerational equity in practice.

A continuous legacy of youth leadership

There remains work to be done to translate the lofty promises of forums such as the 2024 summit to the layered and often unjust realities experienced by children and young people around the world. Worryingly, progress in the representation and inclusion of young people in multilateral governance is set against the backdrop of declining faith in multilateralism, antidemocratic turns in many nations, and widespread youth dissatisfaction, as evidenced in protest movements around the world.

And yet, the outcome of the 2024 summit, particularly the first-of-its-kind Declaration on Future Generations, enshrined an intergenerational ethic at the heart of the multilateral system. The declaration considers the past, present, and future as a set of interlinked flows that shape the material realities of the children and young people of today and tomorrow.

This type of intergenerational outlook is something that young people have been campaigning for through their participation in multilateral institutions – from Thalen’s speech at the 1970 World Youth Assembly to then 12-year-old Severn Cullis-Suzuki’s words at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit or Thunberg’s many speeches at UN climate summits. From the 1970 assembly to the 2024 summit and beyond, there is a continuous legacy of youth leadership. This legacy, which is embodied in young people’s insistent demands that global institutions evolve to more meaningfully represent them and their successors, continues to influence the shape and scope of multilateralism today.

Explore the Full Study

This chapter is part of a Deep Dive of Young Researchers who worked on Youth Participation for three years. This deep dive is a global collection of 12 case studies unpacking how young people are reshaping political engagement.

The Young Researchers’ Network is an initiative developed in the framework of the European Democracy Hub and EPD’s Women and Youth in Democracy WYDE Civic Engagement project, supported by the European Union.

Get to know the 12 Young Researchers

[i] “Youth2030: Working With and for Young People”, United Nations Youth Office, 2018, https://www.un.org/youthaffairs/sites/default/files/2024-12/Youth2030_UN%20Youth%20Strategy_EN.pdf.

[ii] “International Zone: Unlike Their Elders” (video), United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 1970, https://www.unesco.org/archives/multimedia/document-5119.

[iii] “U Thant on the World Youth Assembly” (radio), WNYC, 6 May 1970, https://www.wnyc.org/story/u-thant-on-the-world-youth-assembly/.

[iv] “International Zone,” UNESCO.

[v] “World Youth Assembly, United Nations Headquarters, New York, N.Y., 9-17 July 1970. Message to the General Assembly of the United Nations, Reports of the Commissions, Statements to the World Youth Assembly”, United Nations (UN) Digital Library, 30 July 1970, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3906570?ln=en&v=pdf.

[vi] “World Youth Assembly”, UN Digital Library.

[vii] Darius S. Jhabvala, “World youth assembly runs into new snags”, Boston Globe, 14 May 1970.

[viii] “International Zone”, UNESCO.

[ix] “World Youth Assembly”, UN Digital Library.

[x] Robert H. Estabrook, “Powers argue over U.N. youth assembly”, Washington Post, 10 January 1970.

[xi] Darius S. Jhabvala, “World youth assembly opens today at UN”, Boston Globe, 9 July 1970.

[xii] Jhabvala, “New snags”.

[xiii] Kathleen Teltsch, “World Youth Assembly”, New York Times, 20 July 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/07/20/archives/world-youth-assembly-parroting-of-elders-slogans-in-familiar.html.

[xiv] “United Nations: Professional Youths”, Time, 27 July 1970, https://time.com/archive/6843354/united-nations-professional-youths/.

[xv] “International Zone”, UNESCO.

[xvi] “International Zone”, UNESCO.

[xvii] William Fulton, “U. N. youth parley invites reds”, Chicago Tribune, 11 July 1970.

[xviii] “International Zone”, UNESCO.

[xix] “International Zone”, UNESCO.

[xx] “U.N. Parley disillusions youth”, Chicago Tribune, 20 July 1970.

[xxi] Darius S. Jhabvala, “Faith in young deeply shaken by world youth assembly”, Boston Globe, 19 July 1970.

[xxii] “U.N. Parley”, Chicago Tribune.

[xxiii] “International Zone”, UNESCO.

[xxiv] “International Zone”, UNESCO.

[xxv] Mark Ortiz, Charles Mankhwazi, and Neeshad Shafi, “Who is going to talk about my granddad? Who is going to talk about me?”, Climate and Development 16, no. 10 (2024), https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2024.2360618.

[xxvi] Stuart C. Aitken, “What happened to adventurous young people and their cool places?”, Children’s Geographies 17, no. 1 (2019): 9–12.

[xxvii] “World Youth Assembly”, UN Digital Library.

[xxviii] “World Youth Assembly”, UN Digital Library.

[xxix] Nuurrianti Jalli, “From anime to activism: How the ‘One Piece’ pirate flag became the global emblem of Gen Z resistance”, The Conversation, 24 September 2025, https://theconversation.com/from-anime-to-activism-how-the-one-piece-pirate-flag-became-the-global-emblem-of-gen-z-resistance-265526.

[xxx] Sarah Pickard, “Young Environmental Activists and Do-It-Ourselves (DIO) Politics: Collective Engagement, Generational Agency, Efficacy, Belonging and Hope”, Journal of Youth Studies 25, no. 6 (2022): 730–50, https://doi.org/10.1080/13676261.2022.2046258.

[xxxi] “Action Days for the Future” (video), UN Web TV, 22 September 2024, https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k12/k12uooughw?_gl=1*llk69a*_ga*MjAwNzI3NTE3MC4xNzY5NTQ0OTYw*_ga_TK9BQL5X7Z*czE3Njk1NDQ5NTkkbzEkZzAkdDE3Njk1NDQ5NTkkajYwJGwwJGgw.

The post Chapter 7 by Mark Ortiz first appeared on Youth Democracy Cohort.

Enhancing Youth Representation in Zimbabwe Through Effective Quotas

Across the globe, quotas have been used to promote the inclusion of underrepresented social groups. Indeed, the introduction of such provisions in politics is widely regarded as a legitimate way of ensuring equal opportunities.^[i]Previously, representational politics centred on gender quotas; recently, the focus has shifted to youth quotas.

Reports by the Inter-Parliamentary Union highlight that about half of the global population is aged under 30, yet young people are underrepresented in national parliaments: in 2023, only 2.8% of the world’s parliamentarians were under 30, while 18.8% were under 40.^[ii] This lack of youth representation diminishes institutional credibility, intensifies young people’s feelings of powerlessness, and prevents parliaments from effectively addressing the critical issues that affect this social group.^[iii]

But while youth quotas appear to be desirable political tools, there is no consensus on their impact on representation. Beyond their potential benefits, the novelty of quotas and the broader political and institutional framework in which they are implemented also play fundamental roles in shaping youth inclusion.^[iv] Thus, youth quotas, although progressive, are “merely one aspect of the more important project of ‘democratising democracy’”.^[v]

Zimbabwe introduced a youth quota system in 2021. This chapter examines the conditions under which quotas contribute to the equal and fair representation of young people in the country’s parliament. Specifically, the study explores to what extent Zimbabwe’s quota system is accompanied by an ecosystem of institutions, laws, and programmes that promote youth participation in the legislature. The findings will help inform policy in countries such as Zimbabwe that are new to the use of youth quotas.

Dr Oripha Chimwara is a political scientist and author whose work focuses on natural resource governance, women, and youth participation, advocating for inclusive decision-making and democratic accountability.

Get to know Oripha

Methodology

This study employed a qualitative methodology to examine the influence of Zimbabwe’s youth quota on promoting youth inclusion in parliament. The research was carried out as part of the author’s PhD study on youth participation and representation in Zimbabwe. Interviews were conducted with parliamentary officials, four young parliamentarians, and six youth activists.

The parliamentarians and activists were selected according to strict criteria. The former were members of the Zimbabwean parliament that was formed after the 2023 general elections; they were all aged between 18 and 35 at the time of their election. The latter were members of the same age group who were working either independently or under a registered civil society organisation. The criteria of sex, education level, and party affiliation were not used either to include or to exclude participants.

The study also drew on primary and secondary source documents to place the findings in a broader national and international context. Documents consulted included journal articles, election observation reports, civil society organisation reports, and media reporting, such as press releases and newspaper articles.

This approach, based on multiple qualitative methods, ensured corroboration of the findings. Research participants were assured of anonymity through the removal of all identifiers and the use of codification.

Introduction of a youth quota in Zimbabwe

The paradox of elections is that they can be used to promote or undermine democratic governance.^[vi] Having now held several elections since gaining independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has a political landscape marked by feelings of apathy, despair, and resignation among a significant number of young people.^[vii]

The issue of youth representation in Zimbabwe’s national parliament is a relatively recent phenomenon, although a women’s quota has existed since 2013. Calls for greater youth inclusion in parliament have come from both local and international organisations. In 2019, the Youth Empowerment and Transformation Trust (YETT) called for 50% youth quotas for political parties, parliament, and government to ensure young people’s effective representation and participation in democratic processes.^[viii] A 2018 report by the Zimbabwe Election Support Network highlighted the need to involve young candidates in decision-making.^[ix]

Similar views were expressed during a 2018 conference led by the Mandela Institute for Development Studies titled “Reigniting Hope for Democracy beyond Elections in Zimbabwe”. Participants argued that because young people constitute a majority of citizens in Zimbabwe, this should be reflected in the make-up of leadership positions, including in parliament. International election observers, such as the Commonwealth, also urged Zimbabwe to consider a youth quota system similar to those of other countries, like Rwanda.

In response to these calls, a constitutional amendment in 2021 introduced a youth quota system in Zimbabwe for the first time. The system reserves 10 out of 280 seats in the National Assembly – the lower house of the national parliament – for members aged between 21 and 35, one from each of the country’s 10 provinces. They are elected by party-list proportional representation.^[x] This system was first used in the 2023 general elections.

Zimbabwe’s youth quota of just under 4% is comparable with that of the four other countries that have a similar system: Uganda (1.2%), Rwanda (1.8%), Kenya (3.4%), and Morocco (7.6%).^[xi]

Impact of the youth quota

Zimbabwe’s introduction of a youth quota system has had far-reaching implications for representational politics in the country and for the structure of parliament, in addition to providing a foundation from which to improve Zimbabwean democracy. Indeed, the quota system is the most significant advance in youth representation in Zimbabwe’s current parliament. The Commonwealth’s 2023 election observation mission commended the establishment of the youth quota.^[xii]

Four research participants interviewed for this study expressed their support for the quota, calling it a “positive beginning” for youth representation in parliament. They argued that the quota creates an open political environment for young people to attain leadership roles. These roles are often difficult to reach through traditional party pathways because of prevailing cultural factors, which place the elderly in sacrosanct positions.^[xiii] In the words of one study, young Zimbabweans have to navigate “gerontocratic masculinities”.^[xiv]

Supporting the youth quota, one young parliamentarian from the main opposition party argued that “the youth quota is a progressive measure which should be applauded as it shows that the Zimbabwean government is pushing towards the best international practices on ensuring youth [can] participate in decision-making institutions”.^[xv]

The youth quota has also increased the number of young people who stand as candidates in elections. This confirms earlier research that found that the youth quota has promoted young people’s candidacies.^[xvi] Interviewees highlighted that “for the first time, many youths were not afraid to stand as candidates”. Others argued that the quota’s significance lies in the fact that it serves as an “initiation process” for young people into decision-making.

As a result of the youth quota, Zimbabwe’s 2023 elections saw an increase in the number of young people in parliament for the first time since 1980. A total of 35 young people were elected;^[xvii] in addition to the 10 under the youth quota, this figure includes eight parliamentarians who were elected through a separate quota for women and 17 who were elected directly under no quota. Thus, youth representation in the 2023 parliament stood at 12%, an increase from 2% in the previous legislature.^[xviii]

Comparing Zimbabwe with its neighbours reveals a positive link between the presence of a youth quota and the level of youth representation. In the European Partnership for Democracy’s 2025 Global Youth Participation Index (GYPI), Zimbabwe achieved a score of 13 out of 100 for youth representation in the legislature, significantly higher than Mozambique’s 3 out of 100, Zambia’s 2 out of 100, and Botswana’s 0 out of 100 – all countries that lack youth quotas.^[xix] In contrast, South Africa, which also does not have a quota, scored 14 out of 100.^[xx] These scores illustrate that while a quota can enhance youth representation in the legislature, other factors, including the quality of political rights, are also crucial. On this dimension, South Africa performed well, scoring 86 out of 100, compared with Zimbabwe’s 28 out of 100.^[xxi]

Zimbabwe’s introduction of a youth quota system – combined with the existing quota system for women, which was extended by a constitutional amendment in 2021 – broadened the avenues for young people to be elected. Still, while young women had more options for getting elected than their male counterparts, they remain underrepresented in parliament. Of the 10 seats reserved for young people, only three are occupied by women.^[xxii] Meanwhile, only one of the 17 young parliamentarians who entered the legislature by direct election is a woman. Eight young women from the ruling ZANU-PF party were elected under the women’s quota.

Despite the positive outcome of the youth quota, concerns have been raised about its implementation. The 2019 YETT report questioned the extent to which the dynamics of political engagement in Zimbabwe could be effectively addressed through the country’s party-list system.^[xxiii] There has also been criticism of the limited number of seats reserved for young people. This view was supported by nearly 80% of the study participants.

Indeed, establishing a quota of 10 youth seats highlights the imbalance in parliamentary representation in a country where young people make up the majority of the adult population.^[xxiv] The quota system should therefore be viewed as one element of a broader democratic project aimed at promoting youth representation in parliament. Zimbabwe’s wider institutional and political framework needs to be structured in a way that reflects the ethos of the representation agenda.

Overall, Zimbabwe’s first experience of a youth quota system has been somewhat beneficial, yet its impact on long-term democratic growth is unclear. On the one hand, by ensuring a minimum number of young people in the legislature, the quota has allowed for some youth representation. On the other hand, the quota alone is not what drives young Zimbabweans’ political involvement, as it allocates only 10 reserved seats, whereas 17 young people were directly elected to the current parliament with no quota. This underscores that meaningful youth representation depends on favourable political conditions more broadly.

The quota therefore risks serving as a ceiling rather than a floor: it suggests that as long as the 10 designated seats are occupied, the issue of youth engagement has been sufficiently addressed. Thus, rather than encouraging and promoting young candidates across all constituencies, the quota may in fact limit the growth of youth representation by standardising a fixed, limited number of young parliamentarians.

This dynamic raises concerns about the potential of quotas to deepen democracy in Zimbabwe. By highlighting the youth presence in parliament, the regime can project an image of inclusiveness without tackling fundamental reforms to liberalise the country’s broader political environment.

Challenges to youth representation in Zimbabwe

The issue of youth representation in Zimbabwe’s parliament should not be viewed solely through the lens of quotas. The democratic task of ensuring youth participation should also focus on the broader political and institutional environment in which the quota system is implemented. An analysis of the 2023 elections, when the quota was first used, reveals that several structural, economic, and political factors hindered young people’s participation and their subsequent uptake of leadership positions.

Young Zimbabweans faced various administrative challenges during the elections that affected their ability to register to vote and stand as candidates. For example, some young people had to pay an additional US$2 for travel to registration centres that were not well located.^[xxv]

Another administrative challenge was the exorbitant fees required to register as a parliamentary or presidential candidate. A 2022 law had increased the nomination fee for a constituency election from US$50 to US$1,000.^[xxvi] This 1,900% increase made Zimbabwe the country with the highest nomination fees in the region.^[xxvii] Such fees disadvantaged potential young candidates.^[xxviii]

Election campaigns further increase the cost of politics for young people. A 2001 act provides state funding for parties that received at least 5% of the vote in the previous general elections.^[xxix] In 2023, a total of Z$1.5 billion was disbursed to qualifying political parties, with ZANU-PF receiving just over Z$1 billion and the remaining Z$450 million being given to the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) Alliance.^[xxx]

The significance of state funding for political parties when it comes to youth participation is twofold. First, because only qualifying parties receive this funding, parties are instrumental in financing campaigns. Campaign costs are high for individuals, especially young people who decide to run as independent candidates or come from minor parties that do not get state funding.

Second, resource disparities between ZANU-PF and the MDC Alliance unevenly affect the relative chances of these parties’ candidates. Worse, reports indicate that in the 2023 elections, ZANU-PF used many state resources for its campaign, the costs of which were covered by the party directly.^[xxxi] Meanwhile, the MDC Alliance had limited resources, and the party’s individual candidates bore their own campaign costs.^[xxxii] Party alignment thus influences the cost of politics for young Zimbabweans.

The cost of politics in Zimbabwe is also high because of clientelism. A clientelist party provides material benefits to its supporters in exchange for their votes.^[xxxiii] Such parties are commonly observed in countries with high levels of poverty; the benefits offered include branded clothing, food, and other forms of assistance. Clientelism implies that during election periods, the electorate expects aspiring candidates to provide such inducements. Elections are thus a give-and-take, which some young people use to their advantage. But clientelism is a double-edged sword, aspiring young candidates may lack the material benefits to reward their supporters.

Interviewees agreed that Zimbabwe’s electoral politics is characterised by what is known as the “politics of the belly”. This practice refers to the material items, in particular food, that the electorate expects from political parties and candidates. In Zimbabwe, the politics of the belly thrives among young people, many [BY1] of whom are unemployed.^[xxxiv] Thus, rather than aspiring to stand as candidates, some young people opportunistically take on marginal roles during elections, such as serving as foot soldiers in exchange for material benefits. In the words of a 2024 study, young people’s “vulnerability to unemployment and lack of resources force them to participate in politics in peripheral roles that allow them to survive through benefits extended to them by patronage systems”.^[xxxv]

Gatekeeping by political-party leaderships is another challenge that affects young people who seek political office outside the quota system. In particular, the main opposition party employed a controversial method of selecting candidates called bereka mwana, in which supporters form a queue behind their preferred candidate.^[xxxvi] Three-fifths of the research participants agreed that political parties did not prioritise young candidates. In particular, one young parliamentarian argued that the candidate selection process was not based on age but was a simple case of winner takes all.

Young Zimbabweans therefore continue to be structurally and politically excluded, and evidence shows that the quota system of reserved seats is far from addressing these issues. Structural reforms and an accountable, inclusive governance system are needed to ensure sustained youth representation in the country’s legislature.

Conclusions and recommendations

Youth quotas are an essential tool for encouraging youth representation in national parliaments. Zimbabwe has joined four other countries – Rwanda, Kenya, Morocco, and Uganda – in reserving seats in the legislature for young parliamentarians. While Zimbabwe’s youth quota system is relatively new compared with the more established system of gender quotas, it has already yielded positive results.

This view is validated by GYPI data for Zimbabwe and its neighbours Botswana, Zambia, and Mozambique, which do not have youth quotas. Beyond the reserved seats, Zimbabwe’s youth quota had ripple effects, with more young people standing as candidates in the 2023 elections than in the previous contest. As a result, 17 young people were elected from the country’s 210 constituencies under the normal rules.

Still, beyond the quota’s short-term influence in promoting youth inclusion and representation in parliament, the measure’s sustainability is unclear in the broader context of Zimbabwe’s institutional and political environment. Visible setbacks, including administrative hurdles, nomination fees, gatekeeping by political parties, and an entrenched patronage system, hinder the durability of an open space for youth participation.

To ensure the sustained positive impacts of this representational tool, the quota should be implemented in an environment with youth-friendly administrative guidelines and an open political space. To this end, the following four steps would help ensure sustainable youth representation in Zimbabwe’s parliament.

First, the country’s political parties should either adopt a voluntary candidate quota listing or prioritise young candidates during elections. They should also finance young candidates to promote their effective participation.

Second, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission should ensure its registration centres are in accessible locations to promote the registration of young voters.

Third, the government should revoke the 2022 law that increased the nomination fees for constituency elections and reduce the exorbitant costs of registering a candidacy.

Finally, the women’s quota must be revised to include some reserved seats for young women.

Zimbabwe’s youth quota system is a welcome and progressive instrument, but it needs to be implemented within an ecosystem of youth-friendly electoral norms. While the quota has offered short-term gains for youth representation, its long-term democratic value depends on whether it forms part of a genuinely open political environment. Sustainable youth representation in Zimbabwe’s parliament requires a political and administrative framework conducive to youth participation throughout the electoral cycle.

Explore the Full Study

This chapter is part of a Deep Dive of Young Researchers who worked on Youth Participation for three years. This deep dive is a global collection of 12 case studies unpacking how young people are reshaping political engagement.

The Young Researchers’ Network is an initiative developed in the framework of the European Democracy Hub and EPD’s Women and Youth in Democracy WYDE Civic Engagement project, supported by the European Union.

Get to know the 12 Young Researchers

[i] Drude Darlerup, “Quotas are changing the history of women”, in “The Implementation of Quotas: African Experiences Quota Report Series”, edited by Julie Ballington, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2004.

[ii] “Youth Participation in National Parliaments: 2023”, Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2023, https://www.ipu.org/resources/publications/reports/2023-10/youth-participation-in-national-parliaments-2023.

[iii] Yvonne Kemper, “Youth Participation in Parliaments and Peace and Security Contribution from the IPU to the Progress Study on Youth, Peace and Security mandated by SC Resolution 2250”, Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2015,

https://www.ipu.org/sites/default/files/documents/tp_youth_participation_in_parliaments_and_peace_and_security_ipu.pdf.

[iv] Kemper, “Youth Participation”.

[v] Andrea Cornwall and Anne Marie Goertz, “Democratizing Democracy: Feminist Perspectives”, Democratization 12, no. 5 (2005): 783–800.

[vi] Gilbert Muruli Khadiagala, Khabele Matlosa, and Victor Shiale, “When Elephants Fight: Preventing and Resolving Election-Related Violence in Africa”, Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa, 2010.

[vii] Rose Jaji, “Youth Masculinities in Zimbabwe’s Congested Gerontocratic Political Space”, Africa Development 45, no. 3 (2020): 77–96.

[viii] “Towards a New National Youth Policy for Zimbabwe”, Youth Empowerment and Transformation Trust (YETT), 2019, https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/items/27d119f0-92f9-4d8c-87e3-c853b3c10119.

[ix] “ZESN Report on the 30 July 2018 Harmonised Elections”, Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), 2018, https://www.zesn.org.zw/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ZESN-Preliminary-Statement-on-the-30-July-Harmonised-Elections.pdf.

[x] Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 2) Act, 2021 (Act No. 2 of 2021) S 124 (1) (c).

[xi] “Youth participation in national parliaments”, Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2021, https://www.ipu.org/youth2021.

[xii] “Zimbabwe 2023 Final Report”, European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM), 2023, https://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/download/file/8a8629a88fb836fd018fba27b2b90010/Final+Report+Zimbabwe+2023.pdf.

[xiii] David Adeleke, “The Real Reasons Why Africa’s Young People Vote for Old Men”, Ventures Africa, 2017, http://venturesafrica.com/the-real-reasons-why-africas-youngpeople-vote-for-old-men/.

[xiv] Jaji, “Youth Masculinities”.

[xv] Interviewee no. 2, Harare, March 2025.

[xvi] Fadzai Mutasa and Enock Ndawana, “Youth participation in Zimbabwe’s electoral processes post-2008: Challenges and prospects for peacebuilding”, African Security Review 33, no. 3 (2024): 277–93, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10246029.2024.2377589.

[xvii] Interview data, Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2024.

[xviii] Interview data, Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2024.

[xix] “Global Youth Participation Index”, European Partnership for Democracy (EPD), 2025, https://youthdemocracycohort.com/global-youth-participation-index/.

[xx] “Global Youth”, EPD.

[xxi] “Global Youth”, EPD.

[xxii] “2024 National Youth Day Statement”, ZESN, 2024, https://www.zesn.org.zw/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/2024-National-Youth-Day-Statement-by-ZESN.pdf.

[xxiii] “Towards a New”, YETT.

[xxiv] “Zim Politicians Push for Youth Quota”, Business Times, 24 February 2020, https://businesstimes.co.zw/zim-politicians-push-for-youth-quota/.

[xxv] Lloyd Pswarayi, “Between Rocks and Hard Places – Zimbabwean youth and the challenges of political participation”, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 22 August 2023, https://za.boell.org/en/2023/08/22/between-rocks-and-hard-places-zimbabwean-youth-and-challenges-political-participation.

[xxvi] “Harmonised Elections Report”, ZESN, 2023, https://www.zesn.org.zw/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/ZESN-2023-Harmonised-Election-Report.pdf.

[xxvii] Linda Mujuru, “Zimbabwe’s 1,900% Increase in Fees to Run for Office Excludes Underrepresented Candidates”, Global Press Journal, 23 August 2023, https://globalpressjournal.com/africa/zimbabwe/zimbabwes-1900-increase-fees-run-office-excludes-underrepresented-candidates/.

[xxviii] “Interim Statement of the Commonwealth Observer Group to the 2023 Zimbabwe Harmonised Elections”, The Commonwealth, 2023, https://thecommonwealth.org/interim-statement-commonwealth-observer-group-2023-zimbabwe-harmonised-elections.

[xxix] “Zimbabwe”, EUEOM.

[xxx] “Disbursement of Money to Registered Political Parties”, General Notice 372, 17 March 2023, https://www.veritaszim.net/node/6222.

[xxxi] “Zimbabwe”, EUEOM.

[xxxii] “Zimbabwe”, EUEOM.

[xxxiii] “Harmonised”, ZESN.

[xxxiv] “Africa’s youth are more educated, less employed and less politically engaged than their elders”, Afrobarometer, 17 November 2023, https://www.afrobarometer.org/articles/africas-youth-are-more-educated-less-employed-and-less-politically-engaged-than-their-elders-afrobarometer-study-shows/.

[xxxv] Mutasa and Ndawana, “Youth participation”.

[xxxvi] Patricia Sibanda, “Candidate selection method haunts CCC”, News Day, 28 September 2024, https://www.newsday.co.zw/thestandard/local/article/200032892/candidate-selection-method-haunts-ccc.

The post Chapter 6 by Oripha Chimwara first appeared on Youth Democracy Cohort.

The Cost of Politics for Ghana’s Aspiring Young Parliamentarians

Democracy costs money, and so does politics. Indeed, money plays a critical role in politics, elections, and democracy globally.^[i] Political parties cannot function without financial resources, nor can political debates and campaigns. However, when the cost of politics is too high, it triggers concerns about exclusion.

Ghana’s return to multiparty democracy in 1992 ushered in elections that enabled broad political participation. Yet limited financial resources have hindered fair engagement, creating an exclusionary barrier for groups such as women and young people. Still, Ghana’s rate of youth political participation highlights notable progress and provides an opportunity to create more inclusive pathways for young people to influence policy, assume leadership roles, and shape the nation’s democratic future.^[ii]

Through an intersectional lens that considers youth, gender, and political-party membership, this study seeks to understand the cost of politics in Ghana. Intersectionality explains how overlapping social identities interact to produce unique experiences. Applying an intersectional lens guides participant recruitment and reveals how combined identities shape the costs of politics in ways a single-axis analysis would ordinarily overlook. The study explores how young men and women affiliated with Ghana’s two dominant political parties – the governing National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) – finance their parliamentary aspirations.

Obaa Akua Konadu-Osei holds a PhD in Business Management and is a Teaching Fellow at Maastricht University, with expertise in youth participation, gender equality, and sustainable development across academic, policy, and international development platforms.

Get to know Obaa

Methodology

This chapter is based on an intersectional, qualitative, comparative study involving 12 Ghanaians between the ages 21 of 40 who were hoping to enter parliament: three men and three women from each of the two main parties, the NDC and the NPP. The study received ethical approval from Maastricht University’s Ethical Review Committee.

Interviews were conducted remotely, and participants chose pseudonyms to conceal their identities. To maintain confidentiality, any data that could indirectly identify the participants were hidden. All interviews were conducted before Ghana’s 2024 general elections.

The costs of entering politics

The cost of politics encompasses the many expenses that aspiring candidates incur, from their initial decision to run for election through to their time in office.^[iii] Traditionally framed in economic terms, this cost has been broadened in contemporary studies to emphasise non-financial aspects, such as the social, physiological, emotional, and physical costs that accompany political engagements.^[iv] This study considers both dimensions.

The situation in Ghana

Since Ghana’s return to multiparty democracy in 1992, power has alternated every eight years between the NDC and the NPP, with the two parties dominating the country’s parliament. Party members who want to enter the legislature must first secure the votes of party delegates at primaries. If successful, members become parliamentary candidates on their party’s ticket at the next general elections, which are held every four years.

A 2022 study by the Westminster Foundation for Democracy into the cost of politics in Ghana showed a 59% increase in campaign costs between 2012 and 2016, underscoring that a parliamentary hopeful’s financial capacity is a crucial determinant of their success.^[v]

The country’s de facto two-party, winner-takes-all system concentrates patronage on the winning party, inflating costs.^[vi] Private financing from powerful and wealthy individuals and interest groups for political activities, while common in many democracies, has fuelled widespread dissatisfaction with the culture of money – or vote buying – in Ghana’s political landscape.^[vii] The National Commission for Civic Education, civil society groups, think tanks, academics, and traditional and religious leaders have all warned that excessive monetisation may make politics the exclusive preserve of the wealthy, foster corruption, and undermine participatory and inclusive democratic norms.^[viii]

Political costs

All research participants in this study noted the costly process of securing a spot as their party’s parliamentary candidate. Expenditure can be broadly categorised as travel and transport, social interventions, filing fees, publicity materials, community entry and engagements, gifts for and demands from constituents, or general campaign costs. Community entry, a major pre-primaries expense, involves paying homage to the owners of the land, including traditional and opinion leaders – a common practice in many Ghanaian communities.

The costs of travel and transport and gifts are borne before, during, and after primaries; the other categories typically occur beforehand. All cost elements may be incurred when an individual is chosen as their party’s parliamentary candidate.

Three-quarters of the research participants did not live in the constituency they were seeking to represent (although they did come from those constituencies), requiring frequent travel. Indeed, given the importance of in-person interactions with delegates during campaigns, candidates travel throughout their constituencies multiple times before and after elections. Because of the poor condition of roads in some areas, vehicle maintenance costs contribute significantly to campaign budgets.

The cost of community entry is determined by the number of communities in the candidate’s constituency and the value considered acceptable – either in cash, in kind, or both. Beyond traditional and opinion leaders, delegates and community members also expect gifts and support. In the words of one interviewee: “People call on you for school fees … money to buy food … everything … even money for getting married.”^[ix]

Candidates are expected to continually incentivise delegates and community members before, during, and after the primaries, whether they are successful or not, to maintain support for their party in current and subsequent elections. One interviewee pointed out that incentivising delegates on election day is particularly crucial:

From the day we started the campaign, up until the eve of the elections, we were doing very well in terms of the message we sent to the people, but largely the decider was what monies were shared on the day of elections. That’s what actually makes the decision … the D-day monies [are] very crucial to winning the elections. You can be the one with the best ideas, you can be the one with the best strategy; if this is not supported by money you share on D-day, you can’t win.^[x]

These costs can be so important that interviewees cited limited financial resources as a significant reason for party members’ inability to advance as candidates. Despite the fact that equality is enshrined in Ghana’s constitution, access to finances disproportionately affects women, young people, and the economically disadvantaged.^[xi]

Interviewees acknowledged and valued the NPP’s offer of a 50% rebate on the cost of nomination forms for women, young people, and disabled people. However, overall campaign costs remain high for young people without personal or family financial resources. In particular, many candidates incur high costs in meeting constituents’ demands and engaging with them. As timelines do not govern running costs, this uncertainty discourages individuals without stable finances or financial networks from entering politics.

Sources of funding

Common funding sources for young Ghanaians hoping to enter parliament include personal savings and investments, support from friends or close associates, family support, donations from senior colleagues or party financiers, and prospective contractors. Of these sources, personal savings and investments accounted for “about 90%” of one interviewee’s financing.^[xii]

Although not often, male research participants sometimes sought or received support from senior colleagues or party financiers. For female candidates, however, there was an undertone of the importance of acquiring funding legitimately, which meant distancing themselves from any godfather figure. This difference could be attributed to the fact that women in Ghana are subjected to public demands of higher moral standards than men.^[xiii]

For female politicians, the adage among the Akan people that “a good name is better than riches” holds true. This forms a self-perpetuating cycle in which women are systematically denied the support of senior (male) colleagues who could significantly boost their campaign efforts, given how monetised the process is, considerably reducing women’s chances of being elected.

Other barriers to political participation

Aside from limited financial resources, young Ghanaians seeking to enter parliament face several other barriers to their participation: the practice of vote buying, the tension between funding and independence, the strains of political engagement, and inexperience due to age.

Pressure to accept vote buying

Interviewees alluded to an informal institutionalisation of vote buying arising from excessive monetisation during campaigns.^[xiv] Despite expressing their dissatisfaction with the monetised electoral process, candidates have acquiesced to this practice as the norm. Many lamented the transactional nature of securing the support of delegates and criticised politicians for normalising this practice.

Although the study participants found the practice of incentivising delegates problematic, they also pointed out that money is critical in challenging candidates with existing clout and influence: “You need money to turn heads. If you don’t have money, nobody listens to you. It’s that bad.”^[xv]

Interviewees argued that good ideas alone are not enough to win elections; incentivising delegates, especially on election day, is crucial. They found this practice so entrenched that refusing to do so undermined their prospects from the outset.

Funding needs versus independence

Prospective candidates face the challenge of how to accept essential financial support from friends and family but then preserve their independence once in office. Indeed, they argued that the increasingly monetised pathway to election requires raising funds beyond personal savings.

Funds from friends and family resemble grants: they are nonrepayable, but they create obligations on the recipient. Participants expressed concerns that once elected to a position of power, they may feel beholden to donors and offer favours through procurement contracts, which fuels corruption.^[xvi] In this way, candidates acquiesce to an inevitable cycle of corruption even before being elected.

Financial, health, and emotional strains

An incidental finding of this study was to do with postelection loss and recovery. Research participants discussed three main strains of political engagement: financial, health, and emotional losses. Financially, candidates invest their personal savings in the nomination and election process without an immediate mechanism to recoup that investment if they lose the election. Campaign demands also divert resources away from candidates’ private businesses, stunting growth as funds that could be invested in their businesses are spent on political activities instead. Many worried even more about the losses experienced by family and friends.

Interviewees also discussed the impact of election campaigns on their overall health and well-being. Especially for the nine participants who worked and lived outside their constituencies, long and frequent journeys were necessary to maintain physical interactions with constituents, a critical component of the electoral process. One participant said that he had been involved in a car accident on a major highway during one of his trips to his constituency.

Emotionally, interviewees highlighted that recovery from loss is a process shaped by an individual’s level of resilience and the support of their close circle. Consciously or unconsciously, candidates also bear the burden of the emotions of friends and family who contribute financially to their campaigns.

Regardless of the losses they experienced, participants employed various coping mechanisms. At the personal level, many reported taking a break from their routine to rest, reflect, and regain strength. Others highlighted resilience as critical to their ability to recover.

At the interpersonal level, candidates’ sources of emotional support revealed gendered differences. Men credited not only family and friends but also senior political figures who offered encouragement and mentorship. In contrast, most women cited only their families and friends, underscoring subtle distinctions in the social networks that contributed to their recovery.

The limitations of youth

Finally, the study participants recognised that their political inexperience and limited financial capacity, which contributed to their election defeats, were in part due to their young age:

I remember this very well. A delegate told me I am young and I have more time and so I shouldn’t even contest the primaries but rather throw my weight behind the incumbent … and that was disheartening.^[xvii]

Well, let me put it this way, no one has discouraged me, directly or indirectly, based on my gender as a woman. It’s mostly about me being young and the lack of experience, honestly.^[xviii]

Such rhetoric reflects the gerontocratic ideals that continue to place young people in subordinate political roles grounded in respect for older adults, as young people are often perceived as inexperienced or even irrational.^[xix] Reinforcing these stereotypes leads to disenchantment and discourages young people from actively participating in politics or vying for office.

The way forward

The general dissatisfaction with the financing of political participation in Ghana cuts across gender and party-political divides. In response, the research participants offered a multipronged approach to reduce exclusionary barriers and excessive incentivisation.

Curbing the monetisation of campaigns

Participants appreciated the NPP’s targeted rebates for youth, women, and disabled people in reducing the cost burden for candidates and urged the NDC to adopt similar measures. Yet they recognised that this party-level support cannot offset intersectional disadvantages. For a young woman with limited financial resources who may face gendered stigma when it comes to asking for support, rebates may be necessary but insufficient to cover the high cost of other items.

To check the excessive monetisation of election campaigns, participants called for a two-tier regulatory framework. At the national level, legislation could define permissible expenses, enforce strict spending limits, and ban the use of funds for financial inducements. Complementary party-level statutes could mirror these provisions while offering matching public incentives to reduce genuine outreach costs. If implemented, both tiers must be backed by a national independent body empowered to investigate breaches and impose sanctions.

Reimagining political-party funding

Public and transparent crowdfunding is largely unpopular in Ghana’s current political landscape. However, in the run-up to the 2024 general elections, the two main parties’ presidential candidates, the NDC’s John Mahama and the NPP’s Mahamudu Bawumia, launched digital fundraising platforms.^[xx] The candidate of the New Force, Nana Kwame Bediako, has argued that crowdfunding not only bolsters political integrity but also reduces politicians’ burden of rewarding influential donors.^[xxi] With crowdfunding, the scope of campaign finance is broadened, increasing the participation of party supporters while reducing politicians’ susceptibility to corruption.

Some interviewees suggested that parties could establish centralised campaign pools, funded by candidates and redistributed according to transparent criteria. This collective approach could reduce participants’ urge to outdo their competitors’ incentivisation strategies, as a common spending envelope would guide candidates. Critical to the success of this system, the interviewees emphasised, would be substantial initial contributions backed by rigorous, publicly accessible accounting by party treasuries to ensure fairness, reinforce accountability, and strengthen intraparty cohesion.

Replacing primaries with an electoral college

Research participants recommended replacing Ghana’s delegates-only primary system with an electoral college in which every registered party member in a constituency could determine who is selected as the party’s parliamentary candidate. Under the current system, delegates have become powerful kingmakers whose financial demands, depending on whether they are met or not, can result in benevolent inclusion or punitive exclusion. Interviewees argued that introducing an electoral college would mean a larger pool of kingmakers – too many to provide sizable incentives compared with the status quo.

Political campaigns would therefore be forced to be issue based, while the electoral college would be compelled to vote for the most competent individual, not the highest spender. Even if incentivisation prevails, candidates are most likely to spread their incentives thinly. For example, providing branded T-shirts to 15,000 individuals is more economical than offering sewing machines and television sets to 1,500 delegates. Ultimately, this reform would emphasise substantive policy debates and competence rather than financial clout.

Redefining sociocultural norms on elections

Finally, effective public-awareness campaigns are crucial in addressing Ghanaians’ cultural expectations and perceptions of running for political office. When an individual declares they are competing, there is a general notion that they are financially well resourced and not necessarily that they are standing because of their intentions. Elected politicians have fuelled these perceptions. When the general public observes the significant wealth amassed by politicians in power, the population cannot be blamed for wanting their share of the national cake.

That said, the cycle of corruption can be addressed by creating a culture of shame around the giving and receiving of incentives during elections. By showing the detrimental effects of electing candidates based solely on incentives, a campaign could appeal to the consciences of voters and hopefuls when they request or offer excessive incentives. A shift in societal norms could address the exclusionary barriers faced by financially limited yet competent candidates. Changing these norms would create a new social contract for the way political campaigns are organised.

Voters desire tangible socioeconomic development, both for themselves and in their communities. National governments, through local development authorities, need to ensure such development is equitable. When individuals and communities are empowered, their reliance on incentives from political candidates may be significantly reduced. Breaking this cycle of incentivisation would dismantle the culture of perpetual dependence between delegates and candidates.

Explore the Full Study

This chapter is part of a Deep Dive of Young Researchers who worked on Youth Participation for three years. This deep dive is a global collection of 12 case studies unpacking how young people are reshaping political engagement.

The Young Researchers’ Network is an initiative developed in the framework of the European Democracy Hub and EPD’s Women and Youth in Democracy WYDE Civic Engagement project, supported by the European Union.

Get to know the 12 Young Researchers

[i] Pete Wardle, “Cost of politics: Synthesis report”, Westminster Foundation for Democracy, 2022, https://www.wfd.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/research-wfd-cost-of-politics-synthesis-report.pdf.

[ii] “Explore Youth Participation in Ghana”, Global Youth Participation Index, European Partnership for Democracy, 2025, https://gypi.epd.eu/country-reports/gh.

[iii] “The cost of politics in Ghana”, Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD), 2022, https://www.wfd.org/sites/default/files/2022-02/Cost_Of_Politics_Ghana.pdf.

[iv] Victoria Hasson, The Cost of Politics in South Africa (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2025), https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781953525.00004; Kevin B. Smith, Matthew V. Hibbing, and John R. Hibbing, “Friends, relatives, sanity, and health: The costs of politics”, PloS one 14, no. 9 (2019).

[v] “The cost”, WFD; Wardle, “Cost of politics”.

[vi] George M. Bob-Milliar, “Party youth activists and aggressive political participation in Ghana: A qualitative study of party foot-soldiers’ activism”, APSA 2012 Africa Workshop Paper, 2012.

[vii] Philippe Jacques Codjo Lassou et al., “Monetization of politics and public procurement in Ghana”, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 37, no. 1 (2024): 85–118; Nic Cheeseman, Gabrielle Lynch, and Justin Willis, “Ghana shows a troubling willingness to accept political corruption”, Washington Post, 21 December 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/12/21/yes-ghana-had-a-peaceful-transfer-of-power-but-its-citizens-accept-some-troubling-practices-as-part-of-democracy/.

[viii] “The cost”, WFD; Cheeseman et al., “Ghana”.

[ix] Author interview with Ernest, a male member of the NPP.

[x] Author interview with Tsatsu, a male member of the NDC.

[xi] “The cost”, WFD.

[xii] Author interview with Iddrisu, a male member of the NPP.

[xiii] Dzodzi Tsikata, “Women in Ghana at 50: Still struggling to achieve full citizenship?”, Ghana Studies 10, no. 1 (2007): 163–206.

[xiv] Lassou et al., “Monetization”; Shadrak Bentil and Edmund Poku Adu, “Communication deficit and monetization of political contests at the Electoral Commission of Ghana”, Otoritas: Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan 9, no. 1 (2019): 73–88.

[xv] Author interview with Efe, a female member of the NDC.

[xvi] Lassou et al., “Monetization”; James Yaw Asomah, “Does democracy fuel corruption in developing countries? Understanding Ghanaians’ perspectives”, Democratization 30, no. 4 (2023): 654–72.

[xvii] Author interview with Ernest, a male member of the NPP.

[xviii] Author interview with Patricia, a female member of the NDC.

[xix] Ransford Edward Van Gyampo and Nana Akua Anyidoho, “Youth politics in Africa”, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics 3 (2019): 1–19; Elizabeth Biney and Acheampong Yaw Amoateng, “Youth political participation: A qualitative study of undergraduate students at the University of Ghana”, African Journal of Development Studies 9, special no. 1 (2019): 9.

[xx] Leticia Osei, “Mahama launches digitalized donation platform for his campaign”, Citi Newsroom, 23 March 2023, https://citinewsroom.com/2023/03/mahama-launches-digitalized-donation-platform-for-his-campaign/; “Dr. Mahamudu Bawumia | Donate”, DMB, accessed 3 June 2025, https://bawumia.com/donate/.

[xxi] Daniel Owusu, “Nana Kwame Bediako Launches crowdfunding campaign to avoid political favors”, ModernGhana, 16 January 2024, https://www.modernghana.com/news/1314113/nana-kwame-bediako-launches-crowdfunding-campaign.html.

The post Chapter 3. by Obaa Akua Konadu-Osei first appeared on Youth Democracy Cohort.

The Global Youth Participation Index (GYPI) was developed to provide a comprehensive, data-driven understanding of how young people engage in public life across the world. By measuring participation across 141 countries and multiple dimensions, the Index highlights both progress and persistent barriers to youth inclusion. Building on these global findings, the GYPI Spotlight series aims to go one step further.

These analytical pieces are designed to deepen the insights generated by the Index by exploring specific regions, themes, and country contexts in greater detail. By combining quantitative data with qualitative analysis, the spotlights help unpack the trends behind the rankings, shedding light on the structural factors, lived experiences, and political dynamics that shape youth participation.

Produced within the framework of the GYPI research initiative, the series contributes to a broader effort to strengthen evidence-based advocacy, support policy discussions, and amplify informed debates on youth participation worldwide. Through these spotlights, the GYPI moves from data to dialogue, bridging numbers with narratives to better understand how young people influence, challenge, and reshape democratic life.

To the Spotlights

The post GYPI Spotlights first appeared on Youth Democracy Cohort.

Political participation in Mexico remains a privilege largely reserved for those with financial resources, political connections, and time. Young candidates, in particular, face immense barriers when attempting to enter politics, as high financial costs, restrictive party structures, and the risk of violence restricts their political mobility. The financial burden of running for office, along with institutional obstacles, limits their ability to engage meaningfully in the democratic process.

The Cost of Politics report examines these challenges, particularly their impact on youth participation. Dr. Miguel Ángel Lara Otaola, author of the study, explains: “In Mexico, participating in politics has significant legal, administrative, financial and political costs. In some cases, due to increased violence, participation can result in the loss of lives.”

These barriers deter aspiring candidates who lack the financial backing or political connections needed to enter the political arena in Mexico. This high cost of participation disproportionately impacts young people and those without established networks, limiting their influence and representation. Campaign financing remains one of the most significant obstacles to political participation, as costs often exceed legally mandated spending limits.

On how to address the imbalance of political power in Mexico, the author adds that “political parties must open spaces for young people to register and participate in party politics as well as provide training and resources for them”. Without such efforts, Mexico’s political system risks remaining largely inaccessible. Ensuring meaningful youth participation is crucial for fostering a more inclusive democracy and allowing young people to share their future.

This study is supported by the WYDE Civic Engagement project, which aims to empower youth in democratic processes. Through this research, the Cost of Politics reports unlock the unique processes of electoral participation and their impact on democracy in different countries.

The post What is the cost of running for politics in Mexico? first appeared on Youth Democracy Cohort.